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Abstract 
It is a central claim of modern linguistic theory that linguists do not prescribe, but describe 
language as it is, without pronouncing on correctness or judging one variety better than another. 
This attempt to exclude evaluation is motivated by a desire to be 'politically correct', which 
hinders objective analysis of language, and by an ill-advised imitation of the natural sciences, 
which obstructs the discipline's progress towards becoming a science in its own right. It involves 
linguists, as users of a valued variety, in self-deception and disingenuousness, distances them 
from the concerns of the ordinary language user, and betrays a failure to understand the 
involvement of social values in language, the nature oflanguage itself, and the limits oflinguistic 
science. On a wider scale, linguistics reflects society's devaluing and mechanisation oflanguage. 
Despite growing concern expressed in the literature, and the incoherence that becomes apparent 
when linguists attempt to address social problems using a theory that regards language as an 
autonomous object, newcomers to the discipline continue to be taught that anti-prescriptivism 
is the natural corollary of a scientific approach to language. 
This thesis suggests that the way out of these difficulties is to rethink the meaning of 'theory' in 
linguistics. If we take the reflexivity oflanguage seriously, building on M. A. K. Halliday's notion 
of 'linguistics as metaphor', we are reminded that a linguistic theory is made of language. 
Metalanguage must use the experiential and interpersonal meaning-making resources of everyday 
language. It follows that a linguistic theory cannot escape being evaluative, because evaluation 
is an inherent part of interpersonal meaning. If we fail to notice our own metalinguistic 
evaluation, this is because language disguises its evaluative meanings, or perhaps we are just not 
used to thinking of them as part of the grammar. To achieve clarity about the involvement of 
value in language, we need to turn our metalanguage back on itself - 'using the grammar to think 
with about the grammar'. Some ways of doing this are demonstrated here, turning the resources 
of systemic functional linguistics on linguists' own language. The circularity of this process 
should be seen not as a drawback but as a salutary reminder that linguistics is an interpretive 
rather than a discovery process. This knowledge should help us revalue language and make a 
place for evaluation in linguistic theory, paving the way for a socially responsible and productive 
linguistics. 
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The question that remains is whether we can envision any more 
constructive way to address questions of language and value. 
I would like to think there is something between the apocalyptic 
discourse of those verbal hygienists who seem to believe that 
language is both the cause and the solution for every social ill, 
and the Panglossian complacency of the 'leave your language 
alone' approach. What, though, might that something be? 
(Deborah Cameron, 1995, Verbal Hygiene) 
Vll 
Chapter One Introduction 
Devaluing language is the besetting sin of modern orthodox linguistics. 
In standard introductory courses, students are told that linguists - adherents of the new science 
of linguistics which is founded on the belief system of Chomsky's generative grammar - do not 
prescribe, but describe language objectively, in the way their colleagues in the other sciences 
describe natural phenomena. This enterprise has produced a new kind of metalanguage which 
looks impressively scientific but fails to connect with everyone's ordinary experience of using 
language. 
The essence of language is its wholeness. To talk about it at all we have to split it into 
'components', but if we lose sight of the whole we cease to talk sense about it. More than any 
other discipline, linguistics demands integrity: wholeness or soundness. Because value is part of 
language, we cannot leave it out for very long: if we do, it soon becomes clear that we are not 
paying attention to real language in its social context. Far from being value-free, linguistics is a 
moral enterprise: it confers an obligation to treat language as valuable and value-laden, because 
language goes around with people (Roy Harris 1997:238), and because language is our means 
of giving value to experience. The one thing linguistics cannot be is objective, in the sense of the 
describer outside the thing described. As language users, we are part of the whole that we study; 
there is no getting outside the circle. What language does metalanguage must also do, and to 
recognize this should be the first lesson oflinguistics. 
Where this is not recognized, the discipline suffers from keeping up a pretence. Linguists turn 
a blind eye to evidence of theoretical incoherence. They ignore the inconsistency of claiming not 
to make value judgements and then going ahead and making them anyway. They lose touch with 
the ordinary language user's experience of language, which is also their own experience, and 
because they have lost touch their metalanguage cannot describe that experience believably. They 
tell themselves they are applying linguistics to real-life problems, when often what they are doing 
is setting up technicalities as credentials and then falling back on commonsense knowledge to 
talk about these problems. 
The anti-prescriptive stance in linguistics has given rise to endless re-runs of the'prescriptive 
versus descriptive' debate, with no really satisfactory solution being suggested, although there 
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is much concern expressed in the literature about the discipline's failure to deal with questions 
of language and value, with Cameron's Verbal Hygiene (1995) being perhaps the most 
penetrating of many critiques. Cameron's question, cited as epigraph to this thesis, reduces the 
issues to their essence (1995:223). She pictures the two extremes, 'apocalyptic' and 
'Panglossian', as tinged with insanity, which is very much the way layperson and linguist see 
each other - if they notice each other at all. Her question demands an answer. She, however, 
does not presume to offer one, but only suggests some 'principles' that might help reduce 'the 
damaging polarization oflay language-users and linguists' (1995 :227), these being: that we can 
legitimately make value judgements (but with the understanding that not all judgements are 
equally valid); that we should demand reasons for rules; that we should look out for the hidden 
agenda; and that we should acknowledge the facts (1995: 224-7). These suggestions, sensible and 
useful though they are, do not seem to me to go to the heart of the matter. What is needed is a 
close inquiry into the nature of the theory that has led to a view oflanguage so much at odds with 
the ordinary language user's experience. 
The wording of Cameron's question is significant, though. She does not suggest that the answer 
might lie 'somewhere between' the two extremes, but rather that it might be 'something 
between', and she emphasizes this wording by repeating it: 'What, though, might that something 
be?' She plainly does not hold out much hope offinding a happy mean but rather suspects that 
what is needed is a fresh approach. This might require more drastic revision of our ideas than her 
'principles' suggest. The reason why a compromise is not ultimately a satisfactory solution is that 
in practice it usually means juggling the two incompatible roles of 'value-free' theorist and 
prescriptive teacher. The disjunction between theory and practice involves linguists in self-
deception and blocks progress, as Clyne succinctly observes: 
If the weakness of recent applied linguistics has been its separation from 
linguistic theory, so has the weakness of recent theoretical linguistics been its 
separation from real human problems. ... Application without theory is mere 
methodology (an error much of applied linguistics has fallen into). Theory 
without application is mere speculation (an error which much of theoretical 
linguistics has fallen into). (1987:242) 
It is this split between theory and practice, between language and society, that is the problem. 
Linguists are inclined to assert that they 'take language as it is, rather than saying how it should 
be' (Hudson 1981 :335). But in practice this means talking about language as though it could be 
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separated from its users and its social functions, both in formulating grammatical theory and in 
the everyday practice of the discipline. 
Cameron has suggested that 'The whole issue of norms requires a less ad hoc and more 
sophisticated treatment than it has on the whole received from sociolinguists' (I990:86), and this 
is true in any practice of linguistics. Simply dealing with social issues as they arise is not going 
to work if linguistics itself suffers from basic conceptual delusions about the nature of language 
and of its own metalanguage. Anti-prescriptivism is not just an over-reaction against an excessive 
insistence on value: it is the outward symptom of a whole syndrome of misunderstandings, 
category mistakes and theoretical confusions about language and value. Linguists use the term 
prescriptivism to mean 'forcing foolish beliefs about language on other language users'. But 
being prescriptive is not just evidence of a desire to control others by manipulating their 
language, it is also evidence of respect for the value of language. It is a metalinguistic activity 
common to all language users, linguists included. A linguist who is indignant about the social 
and political implications of the generic third person pronoun (inserting '[sic]' after any use of 
he to signify humanity in general, even when the text long pre-dates feminist consciousness-
raising) is just as prescriptive and just as concerned about the value of language as any heavy-
handed traditional grammarian. 
As the prescriptive versus anti-prescriptive debate is plainly going nowhere useful, the way 
forward must be a rethinking of the nature of the linguistic enterprise itself It may be that what 
is wrong is that linguistic theory is unsound, lacking integrity. To deal with questions oflanguage 
and value requires a kind of theory that does not treat language as separable from the social 
context. And further, we need to ask what it means to have a 'theory' of language in the first 
place. In other words, what are we doing when we use language to talk about language? What 
are the possibilities and what are the limits? At what point do we begin to lose touch with reality? 
We need to think about what exactly we mean by theory when we are talking about a social 
semiotic system rather than a physical or biological system. Then we might develop a proper 
understanding of the place of evaluation in that theory. 
In this thesis I have considered some of the perspectives such an investigation might take. I have 
looked for a start at the growing body of critical literature within the discipline. The problems 
various critics discuss can be summed up in the claim that 
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Far from having the (largely illusory) objectivity of the natural sciences (which 
it likes to claim), modern linguistics constantly projects into its analysis of 
language the biasses and assumptions of a particular cultural tradition, even while 
overtly disavowing them. (Roy HarrisI987:130) 
Challenging an orthodoxy requires support, so I have drawn on the opinions of a wide range of 
authors who are not happy with the discipline's current disavowal of its own ideological stance. 
I have taken seriously the need for a critical approach. Hymes is one who has made this point 
forcefully, stating that 
The point to be reiterated is that use of linguistics must include a critique of 
linguistics. Unexamined acceptance of existing forms of linguistics would be 
mistaken and misleading. (Hymes 1983: 183, original emphasis) 
It seems to me that the 'existing forms' - those currently considered 'mainstream' or 'orthodox' 
- are based on the following interconnected beliefs, all of which lead to denial of the involvement 
of value in language or of the linguist in evaluative practices: 
(i) Language can be studied in isolation from its context. 
(ii) Meaning is separate from language. 
(iii) The relation of form to meaning is arbitrary. 
(iv) A change in 'surface' features does not affect meaning: different surface features are just 
different ways of saying the same thing. 
(v) Different surface features are nothing but differing arrangements of a universal grammar 
built into the brain. 
(vi) The design oflanguage preexists its use in society; it is not shaped by society'S use of it; 
rather, language exists and we find uses for it. 
(vii) All varieties oflanguage are therefore in essence equally good for whatever purpose we 
put them to; it is mere social convention to consider one form better than another. 
(viii) Therefore linguists are justified in rejecting evaluative attitudes to language and in 
believing that if society could be taught the 'facts' about language, unfair evaluation of 
language varieties would disappear. 
My discussion of evaluation in language calls into question the above beliefs, which are 
characteristic offormal approaches to linguistics, in particular Chomsky an generative linguistics. 
I have examined the effects of this belief system where it comes into contact with real-world 
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problems and tries to contribute to their solution. As an example of this I have focused in 
particular on one central text, Labov (I969). In selecting this text, and others, I have taken into 
consideration Halliday's discussion of 'the problem of examples', in which he points out that 
'ideally every example should be a whole text', but that failing this it is advisable to select a well-
known one (1994a: xxxiii). This allows the analyst to refer to the whole text without having to 
reproduce it in full, and to analyse portions knowing that the reader is aware of the whole. Labov 
(I969) is well-known in the discipline, has been highly influential, and is easily available for 
consultation in a number of reprinted versions as well as in the original. 
Because systemic functional linguistics (SFL), associated with the work of M.A.K. Halliday, 
explicitly rejects beliefs (i) to (vi) in the list above, and has doubts about (vii) and (viii), it seems 
to me to be the most promising theory for dealing responsibly with questions of language and 
value and contributing meaningfully to language matters beyond academia. I have therefore used 
this theory throughout the thesis, as support for the criticisms that I am making, for analysing a 
variety of texts, and for suggesting new ways of dealing with questions of value. 
Systemic functional grammar (SFG) is understood and used primarily as an aid to textual analysis, 
but it has a secondary use which is less well-known: it is a means to understanding the language 
of the theory-makers themselves. Halliday is not the first to take the reflexivity of language 
seriously, but to the best of my knowledge he is the first to have built it into his theory as an 
integral part of the linguist's working methods (1992, 1996, 1997). His approach makes it 
possible to put into practice Hymes's advice that the discipline should 'apply the principles of 
a critical, reflexive perspective to its own work' (I 983: 194). Critique is worth little, however, if 
all it means is acknowledging our own ideological positionings and then continuing to subscribe 
to a theory that is designed to deny the belief system that drives it. If we accept that our belief 
systems are construed by language, then we can explore them by examining the language in 
which they are construed, including our own metalanguage. Davidse observes that 'One of 
M.A.K. Halliday's most original contributions to linguistics has been to reveal the dialectic 
between grammar and grammatics, the theory of grammar' (1996: 3 67).1 Halliday has shown that 
we can 'use the grammar to think with about itself. This does not just mean 'using language as 
'As a way of getting round the problem [of confusion over the meaning of grammar] I started 
using the term grammatics ... This was based on the simple proportion grammatics : grammar 
:: linguistics: language' (Halliday 1996:2-3). 
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its own metalanguage', which we are of course obliged to do, because 'there is nothing else we 
can do'; it means turning the explicit metalanguage we have developed for describing the 
categories, functions and systems of natura1language back on our own language in order to gain 
a clearer understanding of how that language makes meaning and thus how our theories are 
constructed (Halliday 1992:32). Besides this, 'thinking grammatically' links linguistics with the 
living of life, helping us clear up confusions in our ways of construing experience: 
I have found it useful to have "grammatics" available as a term for a specific view 
of grammatical theory, whereby it is not just a theory about grammar but also a 
way of using grammar to think with. In other words, in grammatics, we are 
certainly modelling natural language, but we are trying to do it in such a way as 
to throw light on other things besides. (Halliday 1996:34) 
Equipped with a grammar designed for such a purpose we can do more than just admit that our 
theories about language are ideologically constructed: we can demonstrate explicitly how our 
values get involved in our language about language. I have used this method throughout the 
thesis to analyse examples of linguists' own language in terms of SFG and its latest direction, 
Appraisal theory, as well as through ordinary traditional understanding of grammar. The various 
linguists' writings I refer to throughout the thesis are therefore being used not only as literature 
to furnish support for my arguments, or to argue against, but also in many cases as the data I am 
analysing to show the involvement of the authors' language in construing their theory, their 
particular way of seeing language. 
In my discussion I have been obliged to use the labels linguist and linguistics without 
differentiating amongst the many different styles and affiliations that exist within the discipline, 
although I am aware of the problems inherent in using the generic "the linguist". Hasan, for 
example, has complained about the use of this term linguist to mean 'those legitimized as "the 
linguist" by their domination of the field' (1999:35). Sampson also mentions the difficulty of 
settling on a suitable pair of terms to refer to two schools of linguistic thought: 
This book is intended to illustrate the nature and strengths of the empirical style 
of linguistics which has come to the fore over the past decade. I shall need a 
convenient term to refer to the very different linguistic tradition which 
predominated from the 1960s to the 1980s, and even now is very much alive. To 
refer to it negatively as 'unempiricallinguistics' clearly would not do. I shall use 
the phrase generative linguistics. This term has been widely used and I believe it 
is broadly acceptable to most or all of the members of the tradition in question. 
It identifies that tradition through one of its positive features: the goal of 
6 
specifying the structures of languages via formal systems which 'generate' all and 
only the valid examples of a language. (200 1: 11) 
My criticism is directed generally at 'the linguist' whose linguistics is based on an acceptance 
of points (i) to (viii) above - in other words, primarily those working informal or generative 
linguistics, the kind oflinguistics accepted as basic by the standard orthodox introductory texts, 
a few of which are sampled in 2.3 below, rather thanfunctional. (There is of course no absolute 
division into formal and functional- the difference is one of emphasis.) I have also used the term 
linguist simply to mean academics working in the discipline oflinguistics. Hasan calls attention 
to the sociologist Bourdieu's perception of 'the' linguist, with 'his objectivist preoccupations' 
(1999: 44), and I think it is reasonable to assume that the linguist might be viewed this way by any 
academics in other disciplines who have taken an interest in linguistics: sociologists, social 
anthropologists, psychologists, and literary scholars, for example. It is a perception not so very 
different from that of the ordinary language user who, on learning that there is a kind of person 
called a linguist also learns that this is not just a 'language expert' but also 'a person who is 
impartial about language so does not get involved in advising on matters of correctness'. 
The term layperson also needs some elaboration. I have used it to refer not just to 'any person 
who has not studied linguistics', but to the subset of informed laypersons interested in and able 
to follow academic discussions about language. I am thinking particularly of academics in literary 
studies, or education. This makes the term layperson a little incongruous, as academics are by 
definition not 'lay', but I have preferred it on the whole to the negative sounding non-linguist. 
I intend by it the audience for linguistics that Matthiessen and Halliday refer to as 'thoughtful 
people as a whole' (1997:27). 
Because I have used systemic functional grammar to analyse texts and to generally 'think with', 
I have of course used much of its terminology. Explanations are provided where space allows, 
and otherwise reference is made to the relevant section of the standard text, Halliday (1994a). 
As a brief personal note, and in the interest of declaring my values at the outset, I will point out 
that this thesis comes from a background of literary and educational interest in language and is 
based on seven years' acquaintance with the discipline of linguistics: beginning with the 
Chomskyan formal model; becoming disillusioned with that (sharing with Robinson 'an 
increasingly exasperated sense of its inadequacy for my purposes', 1975 :ix); and being saved 
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from complete discouragement by the fortuitous discovery of Halliday's work. It is a record of 
an experience which has yet to be fully digested, and the reader will therefore notice a certain 
inconsistency in the tenor, making itself felt particularly in the personal pronouns referring to 
linguists, which alternate between they and we. A near-decision to abandon linguistics is 
responsible for those in the third person plural, and a renewed enthusiasm for the subject, 
inspired by the insights and good sense I have found in the systemic functional model, IS 
responsible for those in the first. 
The following is an outline of the perspectives taken in each chapter. Chapter Two reviews some 
of the background literature - paying particular attention to the source of much of the damage, 
the standard introductory text in linguistics - and lists and discusses some of the growing body 
of critical literature within the discipline. Chapter Three takes various perspectives on the 
doctrine ofanti-prescriptivism and the meaning of prescriptive. Chapter Four looks at how our 
failure to theorize value and evaluation coherently leads to practical difficulties when we apply 
the findings of linguistics to real-world problems, taking well known texts as examples, in 
particular Labov (1969). Chapter Five takes a step back to examine the discipline's imitation of 
the natural sciences, as being the source of some conceptual misapprehensions leading to the 
attempt to exclude value and evaluation. Chapter Six uses Halliday's Token and Value grammar 
to explore a basic function oflanguage - conferring value on experience (which is by extension 
a basic function of metalanguage - conferring value on language), and claims that Chomsky's 
claims about grammar are based on a failure to take into account the part this natural language 
process plays in his own theorizing. Chapter Seven suggests that Halliday's notion of 'linguistics 
as metaphor' provides an opening for a coherent view of evaluation in linguistic theory. Chapter 
Eight explores some ways it does this, whether we might view evaluation as part of the grammar, 
and why we miss it in our own metalanguage. In conclusion, Chapter Nine briefly lists some 
implications of taking this new perspective. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore what it means to do linguistics in such a manner that 
theory and practice form a coherent whole, instead of resorting to makeshift because we are 
afraid to admit evaluation. 
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Chapter Two Conflicting values in the literature 
This review of perspectives on the prescriptive approach to language, drawn from a variety of 
literature, lay and expert, forms a background to the discussion in the following chapters. 
2.1 Prescriptive and anti-prescriptive literature 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the gap between lay and expert approaches to language is the 
way the literature is polarized, with very little crossover between lay and expert varieties. The 
difference is not only in register (a difference in level of technicality is to be expected), but also 
infield (what they find interesting and important about language), purpose (what they want to 
do with language) and, most of all, evaluative stance, (which is very much to the fore in lay 
literature but purportedly absent from the linguist's). A new student oflinguistics is likely to find 
little to build on in his or her previously acquired knowledge about language, whether from home 
or school or from academic disciplines outside linguistics. 
2.1.1 What the layperson is reading about language 
An area of literature that is scorned or at best ignored by linguists is the reading matter that the 
layperson interested in language is likely to turn to. Cameron observes that 
Metalinguistic activities and beliefs have received, at least in urban western 
societies, less attention than they merit. For it is surely a very significant fact 
about language in these societies that people hold passionate beliefs about it; that 
it generates social and political conflicts; that practices and movements grow up 
around it both for and against the status quo. We may consider the well-attested 
fact that many people, including those with minimal education, read a dictionary 
for pleasure; that there is a vast market for grammars, usage guides and general 
interest publications, radio and TV programmes about the English language; that 
many large-circulation newspapers and periodicals (such as the Reader's Digest) 
have a regular column on linguistic matters. (Cameron1990:92) 
I believe Cameron is making an important point in calling attention to this literature, and I have 
thought it worthwhile to detail some of it here. 
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The works that interest language lovers outside linguistics may be divided into two categories: 
books of curious facts and usage handbooks. There is some crossover, as the editor of one of 
them observes: 'a taste for collecting language facts goes hand-in-hand with a pleasure in "getting 
things right'" (U rdang 1991 : vii) . A contributor to the Linguist Internet mailing list refers to what 
outsiders like to know about language as 'little linguistic cutenesses' (17 June 1994, 5.700), and 
linguists are particularly prone to dismiss people's interest in the 'correct' origins of words and 
phrases - as Hutton observes: 'Etymological speculations outside academically institutionalised 
linguistics continue to flourish to this day, but for the most part they are regarded as the mad 
alter-ego in the attic' (1998:195). However, although such matters may bore linguists they are 
of absorbing interest to the lay language enthusiast. 
The 'curiosity' genre is a prolific one. Books of this kind abound on such subjects as slang, 
euphemisms, proverbs, catch phrases, palindromes, and origins of words and phrases. Brewer's 
Dictionary of Phrase and Fable is a well-known example, now into its fifteenth edition 
(1995[1898]). The following is a list of some other typical examples, from a university library 
reference shelf: Shipley (1945), Dictionary of Word Origins; Thomson and Irvine (1960), Collins 
Everyday English Usage (partly a dictionary of correct usages and partly a collection of 
curiosities, such as word origins); Byrne (1974), Mrs. Byrne's Dictionary of Unusual, Obscure 
and Preposterous Words. Gathered from Numerous and Diverse Authoritative Sources by Mrs. 
Byrne; edited, with an introduction by Mr. Byrne; Radford and Smith (1981 [1945]), To Coin a 
Phrase: a Dictionwy of Origins; Du Gran (1984), Wordsmanship: A Dictionary (a humorous 
work that supplies fancy words as substitutes for plain ones, for the purpose of cutting a dash in 
smart society); Room (1985), Dictionary of Confusing Words andMeanings; Urdang (1991), A 
Fine Kettle of Fish and other Figurative Phrases. 
On the same library shelf along with the 'curiosities' are a large number of usage handbooks. 
Emonds observes that 'Linguists out of contact with the teaching of English might think that the 
handbooks are a dusty reminiscence of a past age and of past attitudes, and no longer meet some 
demand of the market. But this would be the wishful thinking of the ivory tower' (1986: 110-1). 
Indeed, advice books for the anxious proliferate and are very marketable, being used by not only 
lay but also academic readers, who presumably do not share linguists' perceptions that these 
books are unscientific and worthless. I examined a random selection of these and my conclusion 
was that although there is much in them that is passe and unscholarly and sometimes just plain 
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wrong, there is also much that a linguist who keeps an open mind on the question of value could 
share and build on. 
I comment first on four that exhibit many of the faults that have set linguists against them: 
Herbert (1935), Kahn and Ilson (1985), Elster (1999), and Bruton-Simmonds (1990). Herbert's 
What a Word! (1935) epitomizes the extreme style of prescriptive advice: confident assertion of 
preferences, often coupled with refusal to give reasons for them; an overemphasis on Latin and 
Greek etymology; a thoroughgoing political incorrectness; and an insistence on the observance 
of rules understandable only to those who have had a privileged education. It is hard to know 
how seriously to take any of this, given the ironic tone characteristic of the genre, and some 
evidence of humanitarian concerns that belies the gatekeeping: 
A little knowledge of Latin and Greek, Bobby, would be useful to every citizen, 
for every citizen uses a little Latin and Greek every day. I affirm boldly that the 
elements of these ancient tongues should be taught more widely, not less, than 
they are to-day; and not only in the private but in the State elementary and 
secondary schools. They are valued, where they are valued at all, as instruments 
of 'culture' and mental discipline for the rich. I hold that they should be part of 
the 'practical' education of the people, equipping the citizen for ordinary life, 
whether the citizen is to be a poet or a plumber. (1935: 163) 
While Latin and Greek might not be everyone's idea of what the working class needs, the ideal 
of a metalinguistically educated public is still alive: 
The time is here when all communicators, public ones especially, should be held 
accountable for how they use the coin of daily communication. . .. "Explain your 
use of this passive" should cause no more surprise than "Explain your use of this 
percentage rate". If people are bright enough to learn the language of money ... 
they are bright enough to learn the language oflanguage. (Bolinger 1980:387) 
It is easy, from the vantage point of sixty years of changing attitudes, to criticize the prejudices 
Sir A.P. Herbert displayed. But while it is tempting to laugh at a remark like 
I have been asked, Bobby, to say exactly why I object to "commence", and I am 
told that the answer of other objectors has been "I really don't know. It just 
obviously provokes objection". And a good reply too. (1935:91-2) 
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it is also tempting to point out that it bears an uncomfortable resemblance to that cornerstone of 
mainstream modern linguistics, 'native speaker intuition'. 
Fifty years later, in another example of British prescriptivism, we find political correctness 
tempering the claims to authorial infallibility. But there is still an undercurrent of self-
righteousness. Kahn and Ilson's The Right Word at the Right Time: A guide to the English 
language and how to use it (1985) is a large volume (688 pages), arranged dictionary-style, with 
entries covering a comprehensive range of typical 'word worries'. It is a Reader's Digest 
publication, which suggests a middle-class readership troubled by the kind of anxieties about 
language this book seeks to allay (but also serves to inflame). The qualifications of some of the 
contributors are mentioned: six are lecturers in English, three in linguistics (Jenny Cheshire, Peter 
Hawkins, Alan R. Thomas) and one in phonetics (lC.Wells). (The involvement of the linguists 
is interesting - perhaps not all would endorse the underlying sentiments of this book.) The 
introduction commences: 
Why bother with the right word? 'People understand me well enough' is the 
typical response of the uncaring speaker to any criticism of his usage - that is, of 
the way he talks or writes. But do people understand such a speaker well enough? 
And even if they do, what is their impression of him or of anyone who speaks and 
writes in a sloppy, careless way? Much the same, probably, as their impression 
of someone who is sloppily dressed. Using the right word at the right time is 
rather like wearing appropriate clothes for the occasion: it is a courtesy to others 
and a favour to yourself - a matter of presenting yourself well in the eyes of the 
world. (1985:7) 
and concludes with some unashamed triumphalism: 
English today is closer to being a World Language than any other language has 
been in history. It is the international language of science, of pilots and sea-
captains, and frequently of diplomatic, sporting and trade contacts. It is used, and 
even cherished, by untold millions whose mother tongue is quite different. This 
should be at once a source of pride to those whose mother tongue is English and 
an inducement - perhaps even an obligation - to use the language well. (1985: 7-
9) 
Notable in this book are some of the salient features of usage manuals that have set linguists 
against them: the emotive language, generalised value judgements and pandering to prejudices 
- especially the equating of bad English with personal scruffiness (sloppy is the prescriptivist 
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epithet par excellence), low standards, and lack of national pride. Another typical feature is the 
suggestion that we should emulate the language of eminent persons. 
The third example, Elster (1999), The Big Book of Beastly Mispronunciations: The Complete 
Opinionated Guide for the Careful Speaker, is a large volume (426 pages) which includes an 
eight-page list (419-26) of authorities and other sources cited or consulted: many dictionaries 
(British and American, such as the Oxford English Dictionary and Webster's); a number of usage 
handbooks; the 1980s and 1990s State of the Language anthologies by Michaels and Ricks; and 
diverse writers, including H.L. Mencken, Ralph Waldo Emerson, R. W. Burchfield, H.W. Fowler, 
Bill Bryson, Kingsley Amis, Vladimir Nabokov, and William Satire. It starts by sorting the sheep 
from the goats: 
When it comes to pronunciation, there are two types of people: those who don't 
give the subject a second thought and those who do. This book is for those who 
do. (1999: ix) 
and attacking those who would have us all be goats: 
Telling us to pronounce words however we please and claiming that no one cares 
about how they are pronounced is an insult to our intelligence - and an invitation 
to disaster. Would you trust an driving instructor who told you not to worry about 
the rules of the road? ... The sad truth is that lots of people mispronounce words 
every day and plenty of other people notice. (Just listen to all the folks around you 
who say pro-noun-ciation instead of pro-nun-ciation!) And because we know that 
other people take note of how we speak, most of us do care about pronunciation. 
(l999:x) 
The fourth example, Bruton-Simmonds's Mend Your English, or What You Should Have Been 
Taught At Primary School (1990), is one that has been popular in South Africa The chapter 
headings indicate the tenor: 'Flabby English'; 'Ruins of High Precision'; 'Distinctions and 
Avoidances of the Educated'; 'Warning Against a Modern Trend of English'. An Appendix 
entitled 'Different Englishes' seems to promise some enlightenment, but turns out to be a tirade 
against linguists: 
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Yes - to the glory and vitality of English, there are regional differences in 
English, but do not accept the sophism propagated by half-thinking academics 
and fully used by incompetents to gloze mistakes in their writing, that there are 
different Englishes, one as good as the other. (1990: 125) 
Much of the explanation this book contains is mere justification of personal beliefs; for example, 
some rather dubious explanations of how the infinitive works are backed up by the claim: 'I have 
said it before and I say it again: Grammar is based on logic and commonsense' (1990: 119). The 
rule-based grammar it promotes seems to me unlikely to be of real use to its intended readership, 
English second-language learners in South Africa. In common with the foregoing three examples, 
this author is much concerned to express his views about the deterioration of the English: 
Those who blunt this instrument (particularly through broadcasting) spoil a 
treasure that belongs to us and our children, and they should be classed with the 
most dangerous public enemies, and condemned to ridicule. (1990:3) 
It is easy to criticise the apocalyptic discourse and other faults of prescriptive language experts 
and less-than-experts who write for the lay public. However, the advantage the usage handbook 
writers do have is that their works are being used: this fact alone makes it important to take them 
seriously. Bruton-Simmonds (1990), for example, received enthusiastic reviews in the South 
Mrican press. The following is a list of some other popular and scholarly handbooks to be found 
on the university library shelf, a barrage of ideas about language that are largely the antithesis of 
what linguists in general believe, or claim to believe. These are the works a variety of readers 
outside linguistics turn to for information and for advice. The former of course shades into the 
latter: if I look up the pronunciation of Clapworthy (see below), would it be possible to say 
whether I am asking how it is pronounced or how to pronounce it? The handbook writer would 
not think it necessary to answer this question, which is where he or she differs essentially from 
the linguist, who would claim that a phonetic description of a word is the former only. This is 
perhaps why, rather than consult a linguist, the linguistically insecure might be more inclined to 
consult the following: 
KHudson (1977), The Dictionary of Diseased English and KHudson (1983), The Dictionary of 
Even More Diseased English (which list words people react badly to; for example, caring, which 
is listed as causing offence because, according to KHudson, people take it to mean 'nosy-
parkerish'); Bryson (1987), Penguin Dictionary of Troublesome Words (in which Bryson sides 
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with anti-academic lay language enthusiasts, dismissing traditional grammarians: 'Once you have 
said that in correlative conjunctions in the subjunctive mood there should be parity between the 
protasis and apodosis, you have said about all there is to sayan the matter. But you have also, 
I think, left most of us as confused as before', and also gets in a dig at 'structural linguists, some 
of whom regard the conventions of English usage as intrusive and anachronistic and elitist', 7); 
Adey et al (1989), Word Power: the South African Handbook of Grammar, Style and Usage 
(which tries, as many of these works do, to steer a course between prescriptivism and 
permissiveness, claiming its approach 'is not a prescriptive one, although words and forms of 
expression that are unacceptable in South Mrican usage are clearly indicated', 6 - something of 
a contradictory statement); Vallins (1968[1951]), Good English: How to Write It; Flesch 
(1960[1946]), How to Write, Speak and ThinkMore Effectively (whose author claims 'This book 
will do for you exactly what its title promises', vii); Bailie and Kitchin (1979), Newnes Guide 
to English Usage: Essentialforeveryonewhowantstospeakandwrite better English (,intended 
to be a concise but comprehensive guide to good English ... in which everybody will find 
something of value', 6); Todd (1997), The Cassell Dictionary of English Usage (aiming 'to 
provide helpful, unambiguous guidance ... and to avoid any terminology that might be familiar 
only to the linguist', viii); Partridge (1940), A DictionalY of Cliches ('Having formerly been a 
graceless sinner in this matter of cliches, I know how useful a dictionary of cliches could be to 
others', Preface); Rogers (1985), The DictionalY of Cliches (a more recent collection which is 
inclined to pardon sin and even excuse it: 'the cliche has a bad name as an overworked and 
therefore banal expression ... however, cliches can serve as the lubricant of language' , Preface); 
Partridge (1957 [1947]), Usage and Abusage: A guide to good English (dedicated to 'Dr c.T. 
Onions, C.B.E., from whose lucid lexicography, severely impeccable etymologies and humanely 
corrective syntax I have learnt more than I can fittingly express'); Thody and Evans (1985), Faux 
Amis (a guide to avoiding making a fool of yourself in French); Miller (1971), BBC Pronouncing 
DictionalY of British Names (which contains the information that Clapworthy is pronounced 
[klreparI]); Jones (1917), Everyman's English Pronouncing DictionalY, containing over 58 000 
words in International Phonetic Transcription; Rees (1970), Rules of Printed English; 
Bebbington (1970), An English Handbook (which is not intended to be 'primarily prescriptive 
or proscriptive', but contains a large dose of both nevertheless: 'After all, the use of English 
should be concerned with the misuse', ix-x); the well-known Strunk and White 
(1962[1918]1959), Elements of Style ('Get the little book!', xii); and finally, of course, the two 
canonical prescriptive handbooks (though perhaps not as prescriptive as the people who use 
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them): Gowers's Complete Plain Words 1973), which is 'elegantly and wittily written', so that 
it 'affords to the reader profit as well as pleasure' (editor's preface, iii), and Fowler's Modern 
English Usage, which more than others has kept pace with change, because of updating and 
editing, first by Ernest Gowers (second edition,1965) and then by R.W. Burchfield (third 
edition,1996), and even has its own concordance, Greenwood (1969), Find it in Fowler, which 
gives this work a ring of authority on a par with the Bible and Shakespeare. 
Not all writers of advice handbooks are committed prescriptivists. One who appears to be in two 
minds, or hedging his bets - at one moment pouring scorn on prescriptive attitudes to language 
and at another upholding them - is Howard, New words for old (1977); Weasel Words (1978); 
The State of the Language (1986). Some linguists are moving into the advice field and producing 
works that are based on better and more up-to-date observations of language, and are more 
temperate in their advice style. One is Crystal (1984), Who Cares about English Usage? An 
entertaining guide to the common problems of English usage, which tackles common anxieties, 
such as the split infinitive, rather than dismissing them, but differs from the prototypical usage 
handbook in emphasizing tolerance, and the need to lighten up: 
There will always be social division, and so there will always be linguistic 
variety. We can't remove this variety, but we can learn about it, and try to 
understand the way it shapes our attitudes and outlook. At the very least, it's a 
pleasant enough way to pass the time. At best, some good might come out of the 
enterprise, in the form of greater linguistic - and therefore social- tolerance. It's 
no coincidence that 'communication' and 'community' are closely related words. 
(Crystal 1984: 11) 
A similar work is Andersson and Trudgill (1990), Bad Language, which admits that 'questions 
oflanguage attitude and evaluation ... are important' (1990:4), yet manages not to be narrowly 
prescriptive. These two works seem genuinely desirous of bringing outsiders in rather than 
scaring them offwith rebarbative rules. The positive note is a welcome change from the doom-
laden warnings about errors which Bolinger has remarked 'is like the concentration on sin in an 
old-time religion' (1968:279). Similar change can be seen in the Crystal encyclopaedias 
(1987;1995). An interesting new development of the advice handbook is the 'self-help' kind, 
such as those produced by linguists Tannen (1995) and Haden Elgin (2000), applying linguistic 
knowledge not so much to perfecting your language as to living your life well. 
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Besides books offacts and handbooks offering advice, there are many varieties ofmetalinguistic 
literature that the public turns to for information and entertainment, as Cameron observes 
(1990:92, quoted above). General books range from those in the complaint tradition of George 
Orwell's Politics and the English Language (1946) to those in what might be called the 
celebratory tradition. Two typical examples of the latter are Bryson (1990), Mother Tongue: the 
English Language, and McCrum, Cran and MacNeil (1992), The Story of English. The front 
cover of Bryson (1990) carries an endorsement by Ruth Rendell: 'The sort oflinguistics I like, 
anecdotal, full of revelations, and with not one dull paragraph', and the back cover describes the 
book as a 'hymn to the mother tongue', 'a delightful, amusing and provoking survey, a joyful 
celebration of our wonderful language, which is packed with curiosities and enlightenment on 
every page'. For the kind of reader who buys this book, language is a source of pleasure and 
amusement. This is the more attractive face of prescriptivism. Something outsiders suspect 
linguists of missing, along with delight in language, is wonder at its complexities. Bryson 
supplies plenty of wonder, and humour: 
How big is the English language? ... the revised Oxford English Dictionary of 
1989 has 615 000 entries. But in fact this only begins to hint at the total. ... And 
then of course there are all the names of flora and fauna, medical conditions, 
chemical substances ... one of which, incidentally is said to be the longest word 
in the English language. It begins methianylglutaminyl and finishes 1 913 letters 
later as alynalalnylthreonilarginylserase. I don't know what it is used for, though 
I daresay it would take some rubbing to get it out of the carpet. (1990: 139) 
McCrum et al. (1992) also conveys a sense of wonder. Described on the cover as 'The 
International Bestseller', it celebrates change and variety in English, yet with some harking back 
to a golden age of clear values and beliefs, especially in the first episode of the BBC television 
series of the book, in which, against video footage of the bombing of London, Spitfires in air 
battles, and naval landings, Dr Robert Burchfield, former editor of the OED, recalls with wry 
nostalgia 'the finest hour for BBC English - the voice of Britain resounding with authority and 
defiance': 
When the war broke out I happened to be in Wellington, New Zealand. I heard 
Neville Chamberlain speak - but the announcer to me was just as important as 
Neville Chamberlain. It was really some quite extraordinary equation. It used to 
stand alone like some great isolated supreme power oflanguage - so that what it 
said was both correctly said and was the truth. (My transcription.) 
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Both the complaint and the celebratory traditions are represented in the 1980 and 1990 editions 
of Michaels and Ricks' The State a/the Language, two anthologies of general articles on English 
by a variety oflanguage specialists. The first is introduced thus: 
To write about the English language is to discover something about who we are 
and who we are not, and this is true not only in what we say but also in how we 
say it. The language is our most excellently revealing thing. For some it is our 
chief philosopher, for others our best historian. Even as we complain about its 
declining powers - and, as we decline, we are tempted to complain - we 
remember those powers, and, thereby, begin a little to redeem them. But what 
flourishes so well under criticism as our English language? Only our rose bushes, 
perhaps, which the world knows we love. (Michaels and Ricks 1980:xiii) 
The linguist who dismisses all this literature as ignorant nonsense risks losing touch with much 
that is of real concern to the ordinary language user and therefore legitimately part of language. 
2.1.2 The linguist's anti-prescriptive response 
Anti-prescriptive linguists are unfortunately inclined to focus on the complaint rather than the 
celebration when discussing lay ideas about language. Cameron observes that 
In the discourse of linguistics ... the term 'prescriptivism' has a particular value 
attached to it, a negative connotation that is almost impossible to avoid .... The 
typical attitude to it among linguists runs the gamut from despair at prescribers' 
ignorance to outrage at their bigotry. (1995:3) 
'Admirably prescriptive' - Bruton-Simmonds's description of an entry in Chambers 20th 
Century Dictionary on due to versus owing to (1990:63) - is a collocation that can be presumed 
to be entirely absent from the linguistics literature. 
Bloomfield was one of the earliest and most influential of objectors to prescriptivism. He had a 
low opinion of schools: 'Their attitude is authoritarian; fanciful dogmas as to what is "good 
English" are handed down by educational authorities and individual teachers who are utterly 
ignorant of what is involved' (1935:500). De Beaugrande comments that Bloomfield 'was 
intensely bent on establishing linguistics as a "science" ... His book fostered in American 
linguistics a spirit of confrontation not merely against rival approaches, but also against 
prevailing philosophy, pedagogy, language teaching and the humanities at large' (1991:58-9). 
18 
Perhaps the first book for the general reader that emphatically pronounces the anti-prescriptive 
stance is Hall's Leave Your Language Alone! (1950). For the revised edition (1960) he changed 
this inflammatory title to Linguistics and Your Language. He did not, however, change or even 
tone down the following statements: 
There is no such thing as good and bad (or correct and incorrect, grammatical and 
ungrammatical, right and wrong) in language. 
A dictionary or grammar is not as good an authority for your own speech as the 
way you yourself speak. 
All languages and dialects are of equal merit, each in its own way. 
(1950:611960:6) 
For students a decade later, a first encounter with the idea that the prescriptive approach to 
language is wrong might have been a chapter entitled 'Notions of correctness' in a widely used 
textbook (Quirk 1962), which describes popular ideas as the 'doctrine of original linguistic sin', 
and complains that 'in spite of all that linguistic science has done, and tried to do, during the past 
hundred or so years, such unrealistic attitudes to language, and many such artificial, over-simple 
or archaic rules for using it, do still persist' (1962:318). 
The anti-prescriptive literature is as varied in tenor as the prescriptive. Much of it is splenetic: 
The common viewpoint held by these doom sellers and their followers is that 
English is being brutalized and barbarized to the point where now it must be 
decaying under our very pens. If you gauge there is still time left to read beyond 
their dark prefaces, you may be disturbed to discover that you are one of the 
ruthless barbarians pulling down the linguistic supports of our language with your 
'careless, sloppy, uneducated, illiterate usage'. (Boyd 1988:12) 
Maven, schmaven! Kibbitzers and nudniks is more like it. ... Most of the 
prescriptive rules of the language mavens make no sense on any level. They are 
bits of folklore that originated for screwball reasons several hundred years ago 
and have perpetuated themselves ever since. (pinker 1994:373) 
A whole chapter of Pinker's popular book is devoted to ridiculing the 'language mavens' 
(1994:370-403). A subtler attack - irony rather than sarcasm - is Pullum's satire on the 
'linguistic fascists' (1991: 111-119), in which he denounces a 1980s US campaign to amend state 
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constitutions to make English the official language. Aitchison's is a gentler approach: she is 
known for attempting to give linguistics a more friendly face. However, her well-meaning 
'sweeping away the cobwebs' in her 1996 BBe Reith Lectures raised some ire in Britain: 'Her 
ideas are a frontal assault on the rules of the English language'; 'the speech patterns you endorse 
are the direct result of downright bone idleness'; '1 was saddened to hear you use the unattractive 
Americanism IdlOmetre' (Aitchison1997:97-105). 
Some anti-prescriptive literature makes an effort to investigate the prescriptive approach 
thoroughly rather than just condemn or ridicule. Such a study is Bolton (1984), a critique of 
George Orwell's writings on language, unusual amongst anti-prescriptive literature in that it takes 
on a widely respected author rather than an obvious charlatan. A reviewer of Bolton' s book says 
that 'Orwell's views on language 'hold phenomenal power for many writers and academics' and 
that although 'Orwell's standing as a linguistic seer should finally be tossed "into the dustbin 
where it belongs" ... the Orwellian view of language is still alive and well with John Simon, 
Edwin Newman, and hordes of other reformers whose ignorance of linguistic realities, even in 
1987, is every bit as profound and arrogant as Orwell's was forty years ago' (Daniels 1987:162). 
Other varieties focus on the damage the prescriptive approach can do to people. This is the main 
focus of Pullum's article referred to above: 'The hallmark of the English First literature is not a 
desire to cherish the English language ... but a hatred and suspicion of aliens and immigrants' 
(1991: 117). Lippi-Green (1997) tackles accent discrimination in the United States educational 
system, information industry, workplace and judicial system against blacks and ethnic minorities. 
She demonstrates how' standard language ideology in the US functions like a silent but efficient 
machine' and how 'its practitioners are terribly skillful at coercing consent and participation from 
those groups who suffer the most under the weight oflanguage ideology'. However, she makes 
it clear that she is not 'a language anarchist'; she is not against value systems per se, but against 
value systems that are forced upon others (1997:242-3). 
A particularly interesting example of the anti-prescriptive approach is Emonds (1986). This 
article is, as far as I know, unique in its exhaustively detailed use offormal proofs to demonstrate 
that the prescriptivists' understanding of grammar is faulty.! It assumes acquaintance with 
Halliday offers several brief functional demonstrations of the inadequacy of prestige grammar, 
20 
Chomsky's 'Principles and Parameters' model, and acceptance of Chomsky's claim that humans 
are endowed with a universal genetically programmed grammar which makes language learnable. 
Emonds's argument is that prestige constructions involving personal pronouns whose case is 
determined according to the rules of Latin grammar, such as 'Mary and he (*him) are late,2 and 
'I'm sure it was he who did it' (1986:96;113) are in conflict with the rules of this internal 
grammar and are therefore unlearnable. Despite his anti-prescriptive stance, Emonds does not 
confine himself to describing the rules but supports his case with the rhetoric characteristic of 
prescriptive literature, making it clear he wants speakers to adopt the forms he considers 
'correct': 'the mentally fo gged purveyors of proper English'; 'the whole prestige sham' ; 'a dusty 
reminiscence of a past age and past attitudes'; 'a hodge-podge of inelegant and unprincipled 
makeshift stratagems to protect a device used to reinforce class differences' (1986:95-116). 
An notable expression of the anti-prescriptivist stance is Hudson's 'manifesto, Some issues on 
which linguists can agree (1981), which sets out the results of a survey of 'what linguists at large 
actually believe'. This list was compiled to 'show the world that linguistics does after all have 
something to say of practical importance'; however, it is unlikely that it reached much of the 
world at large, as it appeared in the Journal of Linguistics. It aimed to offset the perception that 
linguistic theory was becoming 'increasingly fragmented and decreasingly dominated by a single 
orthodoxy'. Compiled from the results of a questionnaire sent to 29 linguistics departments in 
British universities and polytechnics, the list was intended for use in two seminars on the 
relevance of linguistics to schools. 46 British linguists accepted most of the 83 statements, and 
18 accepted all 83. Hudson says that 'It seems reasonable to claim that other linguists are likely 
to accept these statements' (1981:333-5). The first item on the list of83 statements, under the 
heading The linguistic approach to the study of language, is 
1. (a) Linguists describe language empirically - that is, they try to make 
statements which are testable, and they take language as it is, rather than saying 
how it should be. (In other words, linguistics is descriptive, not prescriptive or 
normative. ) 
for example, on the use the hypercorrect form It is I (1994a: 125-6), and on the 'double negative' 
(2002). 
2 
It is a convention in linguistics to use an initial asterisk to denote a form that is ungrammatical. 
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and related to this, under the heading Language, society and the individual, is 
2.1 (a) Language is amenable to objective study, with regard both to its structure 
and to its functions and external relations. 
Other statements related to the anti-prescriptive doctrine are 
2.2 (d) There is no evidence that normal human languages differ greatly in the 
complexity of their rules, or that there are any languages that are 'primitive' in the 
size of their vocabulary (or any other part of their language), however 'primitive' 
their speakers may be from a cultural point of view. 
2.2 (f) The present position of English as a world language is due to historical 
accidents rather than to inherent superiority of the language's structure. 
2.3 (a) Spoken language developed before written language in the history of 
mankind, and it also develops first in the individual speaker; moreover, many 
languages are never written. These factors lead most linguists to believe that in 
linguistic theory priority should be given to spoken language, and many linguists 
give further priority to the most casual varieties of spoken language, those which 
are least influenced by normative grammar. 
2.4 (b) Change in a language is normally a matter of becoming different, rather 
than better or worse. 
and 3.2e, which is somewhat contradictory: 
3.2 (e) Spelling is probably the most immutable part of English, and the part 
where prescriptivism is most easily accepted by linguists. (1981:335-341) 
Hudson's intention was to demonstrate that 'linguistics really is making some progress, in a 
cumulative way, and we are not just lurching from one "paradigm" to another' (1981 :333). On 
the other hand, Halliday and Fawcett observe that 'issues' are often seen as matters that divide 
people, so that the 'current issues' approach to discussing any phenomenon tends to reflect 
relationships of an adversarial kind (1987 :xi). However, Hudson's document does have the merit 
of setting out issues in the form of categorical statements that are set up for negotiation, rather 
than in the persuasive rhetoric of much of the anti-prescriptive literature. (The anti-prescriptive 
approach is discussed in more detail in 2.3, below.) 
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2.2 Critical discussion of language and value 
There is much critical literature on this topic, centred on the prescriptive/descriptive debate and 
coming at it from a variety of perspectives. Many of the issues and viewpoints mentioned in the 
following rapid review of the literature are taken up in more detail in the following chapters. 
2.2.1 Historical background 
Hutton criticises the current widely accepted view of modern linguistics as a liberation movement 
resulting from 'the overthrow of the categories of traditional, i.e. Latin-based, grammar and the 
rise of "autonomous" linguistics' (1998: 189) which 'has created a kind of blindness to the social 
reality'. He suggests that there is a need to 'make comprehensible again old debates or 
controversies', and complains that 'in the simplifications of contemporary textbooks, many of 
these debates appear as phoney wars between reason and blindness' (1998: 198-9). The following 
are some texts that help restore a sense of proportion. 
Overviews such as Robins (1990) and de Beaugrande (1991) are invaluable, because a major 
problem is that we often read the interpreters, the contemporary textbooks, rather than the 
primary texts. More specifically focused on the phenomenon of prescriptivism are Leonard (1962 
[1929]) and Thomas (1991). Leonard's The Doctrine of Correctness in English Usage 1700-1800 
is an exhaustively researched record of the development of the prescriptive urge in English, 
including various 'ireful combats' (1962: 14) over theoretical issues such as the' genius and right 
nature of English' (1962: 3 2). Thomas's LinguistiC Purism (1991) looks at the phenomenon from 
a broader perspective, tracing fluctuating attitudes to purism in the development of linguistic 
theory, and making it clear that 'no language is exempt from the impact of puristic intervention' 
(back cover) and that 'recent investigators of purism have noted the absence of an adequate 
theory of purism' (1991:9). Edwards (1994) suggests that linguists have misread prescriptivism 
as a specific historical aberration of English; rather, it is an ineradicable part of any language and 
therefore something linguistic theory has to take into account, whatever language we are 
describing. 
Accounts of the rise of standard English can be found in many works. A basic reference is Milroy 
and Milroy's chapter on Standard English and the complaint tradition (1999:24-46). Other 
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accounts are Greenbaum's Good English (1988:1-19); Pennycook's Spreading the word! 
disciplining the language (1994:107-144); and Crystal's The rise of prescriptive grammar 
(1995 :78-9). A controversial account is Crowley (1989), which surveys language debates in 200 
years of British history (with a back cover blurb quoting from a review by Roy Harris: 'a great 
work of demythologisation, which puts the concept of standard English in its proper historical 
perspective'). Honey, however, attacks this work as a 'rewriting of history' and gives a different 
version explaining How it really happened (1997:59-117). He claims that 'it is simply not true 
that standard English, as an identifiable model which carried the prestige which caused it to be 
taken as a model, came into being in the nineteenth century'; points out the dangers of 
'inappropriate projection back into the past of the political and other concerns of the present'; and 
observes that although the term 'standard English' is of recent origin, the concept is ancient, and 
that 'a standard variety of English, both spoken and written, was recognised as existing before 
the end of the sixteenth century' (1997:60;70;75). The belief that prescriptivism is a freak of 
British linguistic history should perhaps be treated with caution. More relevant perhaps is the 
recent history of the debate in Britain over teaching grammar in schools: the Milroys give details 
of the Kingman and Cox reports and related issues during the 80s (1999:131ft), as does Cameron 
(1995: 8 5ff., The grammar "panic"). Christie (1999a: 156-8) also assesses this debate and relates 
it to similar debates in Australia. 
Introductory texts in linguistics usually include a brief history of prescriptive attitudes to English, 
simplifying the issues and thus inevitably distorting them. Fromkin and Rodman, for example, 
imply that Bishop Lowth was single-handedly responsible for many of the well-known 
shibboleths in English ('Lowth, influenced by Latin grammar and by personal preference, 
prescribed a number of new rules for English', 1993: 15). A corrective to this view can be found 
in Quirk and Stein: 'we cannot blame Lowth and his contemporaries for all the pet notions we 
have been discussing. The trailing preposition, for example, is called by Lowth "an Idiom which 
our language is strongly inclined to'" (1990:229). Fromkin and Rodman have apparently been 
swayed by 'personal preference' themselves: any account of the prescriptive/descriptive debate 
is bound to reveal the standpoint of the writer. Even the scholarly Leonard does not restrict 
himself to recounting the prescriptive grammarians' views but also evaluates them: 'not being 
scholars in linguistics, these men were quite unaware that scholarship is a condition precedent 
to intelligent judgement, and their legislation was "emphatic in exact proportion to their 
ignorance'" (1962: 43). 
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2.2.2 The prescriptive versus descriptive debate 
Hudson's first 'issue on which linguists can agree' (1981, l(a), quoted above, 'Linguists describe 
language empirically ... ' etc.) does not find universal unqualified acceptance. That it is a far from 
settled matter is evidenced by the many debates it has given rise to in the literature. An example 
of such a debate is to be found in several issues of the journal English Today, a publication of the 
kind which 'may include contributions from professional experts, but are not read primarily by 
experts and cannot be classed as scholarly journals' (Cameron 1995: viii). An article in January 
1988 entitled The word-watchers sparked a heated debate which ran in this journal through 1988 
and 1989 against a background ofthe Kingman and Cox reports and the question of whether or 
not to teach grammar and Standard English in schools. Some well-known contributors to this 
interesting social document were John Sinclair, Sidney Greenbaum, Braj Kachru and David 
Crystal. Puzzlement was the reaction of one reader: 
if the linguists really describe the way people actually speak (and write), they will 
surely be able to see how they ought to speak and write. A prescription is good 
and useful as far as it is description-based. I don't know why the term prescription 
should always be pejorative. (English Today, October 1990:61) 
Burchfield, however, has observed that 'The battle between the prescriptivists and descriptivists 
is far from over and looks likely to continue into the twenty-first century' (1990: 357). And indeed 
it does continue, as the title of Garner (2001) suggests: Calling for a truce in the descriptivist-
prescriptivist wars. Garner complains about 'the pedagogical irrelevance of modern linguistics' 
and says that 'Despite the decades-old campaign to convince the public that no uses oflanguage 
are inherently better than others, literate people continue to yearn for guidance on linguistic 
questions' (2001: 7). 
Two widely cited texts in the literature discussing prescriptivism are Milroy and Milroy's 
Authority in Language (1999 [1991,1987]) and Cameron's Verbal Hygiene (1995). The Milroys' 
is the standard reference on prescriptivism and the 'complaint tradition' in general and on the 
long-running debate over the teaching of Standard English in Britain in particular. In the 1991 
edition the Milroys pointed out that 
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Advances made by linguists in descriptive grammar have not for the most part 
been understood outside linguistics. Indeed ... general linguists are sometimes 
actually blamed for what has often been seen as a decline in standards of English 
teaching. (1991 :49) 
and the situation was apparently no better when they came to update this section for the third 
edition. They refer to a 1998 article in the Guardian Weekly which blamed Oxford 
undergraduates' misspellings in part on 'professional linguists' for their 'relativist' view of 
correctness, complaining that 'the problem has not been seriously addressed because many 
professional linguists withheld help and support when asked for it' (1999:42-3). In response to 
this sort of criticism from the public the Milroys attempt to legitimize some varieties of 
prescriptivism and thus reconcile the anti-prescriptive professional persona with the prescriptive 
pedagogic one. 
Cameron suggests that splitting prescriptivism into two 'Types' as the Milroys do licenses 
linguists to be prescriptive in one area of their discipline, such as critical discourse analysis, 
while continuing to disparage the public's language concerns, and it saves them from having to 
face the question of how to find a theoretical place in the discipline for norms and values. The 
Milroys' book is a useful study of prescriptivism, but not very profound, offering as it does 
simplistic ad hoc solutions to a complex problem (as is discussed further in 4.3 .3, below). It lacks 
the intellectual clarity of Cameron's investigation, which looks squarely at the problem of 'the 
gulf between linguists and lay language-users' (1995:xi) and obliges us to 
wonder whether linguists have thrown the baby out with the bathwater, by 
criticizing not just silly rules, but the entire evaluative discourse to which these 
rules belong. The typical response of a linguist faced with somebody like 
Dummett or Rees-Mogg is not merely to take issue with the specific (and, let us 
grant, often eccentric) value judgements he is proposing, but to deny that there 
could be any legitimate interest in questions of linguistic value. (1995:xiii) 
Cameron defines the problem and indicates the direction we need to go in to find a solution: 
if linguists are to engage more productively with non-linguists, we need to think 
seriously about our own use of evaluative terms: both about the fact that we do 
actually use them, in spite of protestations to the contrary, and also about which 
terms we use and how. (1995:233) 
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we cannot stand aside from the popular discourse of value. Attitudes cannot be 
changed by fiat, but only by persuasion; and persuading people to any point of 
view or course of action depends not only on telling them what is true to the best 
of your knowledge, but also on engaging their sense of what is right. (1995:235) 
Very many language users hold passionate convictions about what is right in 
language, and conversely about what is wrong with it. Unfortunately, the strength 
of passion with which verbal hygienists express their views and pursue their goals 
is not often matched by the strength of their arguments. If this is to change, and 
if linguistics is to make any contribution to changing it, we must acknowledge 
people's genuine concerns about language, understand the desires and fears that 
lie behind their concerns, and try to work with them, not against them. (1995:236) 
What particularly distinguishes Cameron's book from others on the topic ofprescriptivism and 
makes it clearly the best overview is the way it links the social issues with the theoretical, where 
others are inclined to focus on one or the other. Because of this she is able to see that the 
problem may have much to do with the linguist's own metalanguage. This is a vital insight for 
getting to the root of the problem. 
There are other texts which add useful material to the discussion. One for students is Good and 
bad English in Graddol, Leith and Swann (1996:338-371), which focuses primarily on the 
Standard English and grammar-in-schools debate in Britain. Two texts which explore the wider 
social background are Edwards (1994) and Pennycook (1994). In The prescriptive urge 
(1994: 146-174), Edwards laments the fact that' language planning is subservient to the demands 
of non-academic interests, with social and political agendas' and that professional linguistic 
assistance counts for so little and suggests that 'linguists - despite their traditional reluctance to 
prescribe, despite their sense that language change is a constant and natural process, despite their 
view that broad usage is the ultimate criterion of "correctness" - might bring their skills to bear 
and might, by their contributions, forestall other, less disinterested action' (1994: 172-4). He also 
makes the important and much overlooked point that talking to the public would be good for the 
linguist: 'One result of professionals attempting to reach the 'others' is a more substantial 
grounding of the professionals' own discipline .... the very exercise of communicating with the 
public is salutary for the subject, in just the same way that teaching a topic one knows very well 
to essentially uninformed students can be' (1994:207-8). 
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In Linguistics as a European cultural form Pennycook (1994: 117 - r26) observes that 'from a 
position that claims legitimacy through its status as a Western science, linguistics distances itself 
from questions concerning society, culture and politics ... and at the same time prescribes both 
a particular view of language (monolinguistic and phonocentric) and particular forms of that 
language' (1994: 126), and in The disciplining of applied linguistics (1994: 126-129) he says that 
his 'concern is not so much with the descriptive adequacy oflinguistics (though clearly there are 
many problems here) as with the effects of its claim to descriptive adequacy'. He is concerned 
that linguistics 'posits a series of core meanings and truths that are not in the hands of the 
everyday language user' and this results in 'limitations on thought and action imposed by applied 
linguistics' (1994: 125-7). 
To conclude this section I will mention two journal articles that take the debate into new 
contexts, providing a broader view of the question of language and value: Bolton and Hutton 
(1995) and Chambard (1994). Bolton and Hutton's Bad and banned language (1995) takes the 
discussion of prescriptivism into the realm of a different kind of 'bad' language: the language of 
triad secret societies in Hong Kong, which 'can in some circumstances constitute a serious 
criminal offense' (1995: 159). They explore the social issues surrounding attitudes to triad 
language, suggesting that censorship is not a perfect solution, because 'the repression of bad 
language helps lay the social foundation of its badness', but lauding the way the government 
takes the public's objections seriously because it 'feels it cannot simply deny responsibility for 
the fears and beliefs of ordinary citizens' (1995: 181). They contrast this with the way linguistics 
deals with (or rather, does not deal with) this kind of problem, criticising Labov, Trudgill and 
others for being out of touch with people's fears. For sociolinguists the vernacular may be 
'something vigorous and vivid, and the proper focus of real sociolinguistic fieldwork', and 
linguistic taboos 'the quaint artifacts of linguistic naivete', but 'in the context of Hong Kong ... 
the consideration of taboo language and the vernacular of street gangs involves far more than the 
study of linguistic variation and innovation. For successive Hong Kong governments, this 
language has been perceived as not simply something "bad", but as a discourse associated with 
riots, revolution, and resistance to the colonial administration' (1995: 178). They deplore the 
uselessness of some of the theoretical linguist's key tenets in the face of real social problems: 
'The Saussurean distinction between synchronic and diachronic, which was introduced to break 
the link between usage and etymology, collapses when we look at lay linguistic beliefs and 
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explanations, i.e. lay meta1inguistic behaviour' (1995:162). They do, however, find use for 
Halliday's theory of 'anti-language' (1976), because it takes proper cognisance of the social. 
Chambard's La parole devaluee claims the devaluing of language is not just an oddity of 
linguistics but part of a wider social problem. She believes that 'we are living in a civilization 
of devaluated speech' (1994: 67). She complains of la de perdition de la valeur attachee aux mots 
('the loss of the value attached to words'), among young people especially, and claims that Les 
notions de "mot juste ", d'expression "propre" ou "impropre ", ont pratiquement disparu ('The 
concepts of the 'right word', the 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' expression, have practically 
disappeared') (1994:68). She also targets the empty and impersonal speech of television 
broadcasting, and argues that this has much to do with speech being 'devalued': 
Pour des jeunes nes dans ce contexte, tout cela porte atteinte it la confiance dans 
Ie langage, au sentiment que la parole a une valeur, qu 'elle revele celui qui la 
projere, qu 'elle est it lafois communication et action, moyen et lieu d'echange, 
que par elle on se fait comprendre et que I 'on comprend 
('For young people born and brought up in this context, all this undermines 
confidence in language: the feeling that speech has value, that it reveals the 
person who utters it, that it is at the same time communication and action, means 
and locus of exchange, that by its use we make ourselves understood and we 
understand.' (1994:72-3, my translation.) 
2.2.3 Radical dissent 
In the literature critical of the orthodox stance there are some strong expressions of dissent. The 
general argument is that 'Linguistic enquiry is inherently ideological; and the claims of scientific 
objectivity and autonomy themselves only function as component parts of the linguistic ideology 
dominant today' (Joseph and Taylor 1990: Title page). There are pleas for notice to be taken: 
'The whole issue of norms requires a less ad hoc and more sophisticated treatment than it has on 
the whole received from sociolinguists' (Cameron 1990:86). 
Aitchison is one who has put forward more publicly than most, particularly in the1996 BBC 
Reith Lectures, the view of the linguist as an impartial observer of language who finds 
'interesting' the language forms others are enraged at, and the opinion that 'many people, 
including some of those in positions of power, are back in the dark ages over understanding how 
it works' (1997:9). However, not only was the popular audience not entirely won over, as is 
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evidenced by the letters of criticism she received in response to the lectures (1997:97-105), 
neither were all linguists. Love points out the anti-prescriptive linguist's failure of logic: 
Nor are people likely to be taken in by the absurd assertion that linguists 
'realized' a long time ago that 'no part oflanguage is ever deformed or bad', and 
that anyone who disputes this is a crank. There is no fact of the matter here: we 
are in the realm of taste and judgement, and the lay language-user's taste and 
judgement as to what is 'good' or 'bad' in language are in principle no more or 
less worthy of attention than the professional linguist's. It is simply not the 
linguist's business to be pronouncing on matters ofthis sort. (1998:208) 
He puts the debate into a broader perspective, suggesting we do not yet understand how the 
recent emphasis in linguistics on the role of nature rather than nurture 'affects the traditional 
humanist engagement with languages as cultural phenomena', and concludes: 'That the question 
needs to be squarely addressed is perhaps the chieflesson of The Language Web' (1998:208-9). 
An article that does address the question squarely is Hymes (1983), who observes how difficult 
it is in doing linguistics to keep the social in sight while of necessity decontextualising the 
language, and how easy it is to lose sight of what Singh calls 'the inherent unity and coherence 
of the entire human enterprise' (1996b:3). Hymes criticizes linguists for their failure to overcome 
'the separation between questions oflanguage and value that has characterised the development 
of modern linguistics in the United States' (1983: 191). His development of this theme is worth 
quoting at length: 
Values have been taken as obvious, taken for granted, or else excluded on 
principle, so far as linguists themselves are concerned. The uses oflanguage have 
been postulated as everywhere essentially equivalent, rather than being 
investigated. Indeed, one of the central tenets of the liberalism of modern 
linguistics has been the essential equivalence in use of all languages studied by 
linguists, despite the abundant evidence to the contrary. Some even think it the 
mark of a radical to denounce attention to differences of this sort. Inequality in 
speaking is to be overcome, it seems, by denying that it exists. I cannot explain 
this deep-seated hostility on the part of even cultural materialists toward facts that 
one would think a Marxist would be the first to see, except as a projection of a 
professional bias (all languages are equal in the sight oflinguistics) and a reaction 
against the prejudices of society at large, prejudices which do equate difference 
with inferiority. But I cannot see any way for a science oflanguage to contribute 
to the transformation of a situation of linguistic inequality that it does not 
recognize as existing. I see no possibility of a truly social science of language on 
the basis of this attitude, an attitude that I would call militant, not radical. For it 
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is essential to this attitude that social shaping of verbal means and abilities is 
denied. Amidst all the costs of inequality and exploitation, language is privileged, 
on this view, and remains unscathed. (HymesI983:191) 
In the same volume Romaine argues that the linguistic equality doctrine hampers real research: 
'Since linguists have traditionally tended to assume not only the equivalence of all languages 
with respect to their referential adequacy and power, but also an idealized and undifferentiated 
universal competence of the native speaker, we know very little about the upper and lower limits 
of expressive resources which languages have and which speakers can avail themselves of within 
particular languages' (1984:112). Again in this volume, Dressler points out the prescriptivists' 
ambivalent attitude to language change: language death (which we are licensed to worry about) 
is not a different kind of thing from language change (which we are not). Rather, 'Language 
death is a very specific type of language change' (1996: 195). Interestingly, he observes that a 
'symptom of the terminal decay is the lack of puristic reactions against this massive 
interference .... Imperfect speakers ... fail to notice such "corruptions", and older fluent speakers 
seem to have given up correcting them. This reflects a change in language attitude ... : the 
recessive, decaying language is considered as worthless, not worthy of being properly 
transmitted. Such attitudinal change produces a relaxation of social, sociolinguistic and linguistic 
norms' (1996: 199). Singh's own contribution to this volume (1996b) and his collection of critical 
essays (1996c) examine from a variety of perspectives the problem of how linguistics can engage 
with its social context. 
Critics' objections to the orthodoxy fall into two categories: the social - its failure to be of 
practical use to the people it claims to be concerned about, and the theoretical - the 
inconsistency, incoherence and illogicality of some of its basic tenets. The most outspoken 
criticism of the latter kind, and the most far-reaching in its implications, comes from Roy Harris, 
who contends that the linguist must acknowledge kinship with the lay language user; a reversal 
of the linguistic-scientist-versus-ignorant-layperson approach. In a sweeping attack on today's 
core linguistics, he condemns the 'mythology of the language machine' which 'makes the genetic 
endowment of homo sapiens entirely responsible for how language works'; reduces 'linguistic 
description to the analysis of formal patterns'; 'divorces the linguistic form of discourse from its 
social causes and effects'; 'tells oflinguistic rules buried deep beyond the reach of consciousness, 
and formulates them in arcane algebras beyond the grasp of lay understanding'; and, in brief, 
'dehumanises language' (1987: 173). He links the mechanisation oflinguistic theory to a wider 
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social ill, of the kind observed by Charnbard (above),3 in a passage that outdoes the most 
apocalyptic of the prescriptivists' pronouncements: 
The society which feeds and feeds off this mythology is a society in which public 
communication has manifestly given up on language. The very style of 
presentation renounces the truth in advance. It is a society which looks into the 
screened eyes of its newscasters and need look no further than those saccadic 
responses to understand that one can no longer believe what the President of the 
United States says about international terrorism, or what the local police say 
about the protection of the community, or what the news bulletin says about 
either, or about anything else. What is said is no longer even said to be believed, 
but to be reported as having been said. The primary function oflanguage is now 
metalinguistic. Society already reaps the whirlwind of the language machine. 
(1987:173) 
Harris's relentless yet scholarly expose oflogical flaws at the heart of Western linguistic theory 
- the 'language myth', discussed in 5.1, below - is a corrective to many unquestioningly 
accepted tenets of orthodox linguistics. The Language Makers (1980) claims that 'language-
making involves much more than merely the construction of systems of signs. It is also the 
essential process by which men construct a cultural identity for themselves, and for the 
communities to which they see themselves as belonging' (1980:Preface). In The Language Myth 
(1981) he demonstrates that 'a great deal of impressively authoritative modern theorising about 
language is founded upon a myth' and that the 'rapid metamorphosis [of linguistics] into 
"science", by fiat of the dominant academic figures in the subject, constitutes one of the most 
revealing and disturbing episodes in the intellectual history of the twentieth century' 
(1981:Preface). Following this, The Language Machine (1987) connects the mechanization of 
linguistics with that of society and criticizes the 'computer-age mythology' which licenses the 
Chomskyan idea of 'a biological language machine within us' (1987:Preface). He is concerned 
about the loss of value and the pretence at objectivity: 'any categorisation of usage into 
3 
In a passage too long to quote here (but of which the following gives the gist), Chambard makes 
a connection similar to Harris's: QUi parle, d' ailleurs, derriere ces visages dont les yeux, braques 
sur Ie prompteur, feignent de vous regarder ... ? ... Ie discours est sans origine; nul emetteur 
I 'assume ... Ie destinataire aussi est anonyme ... Parole de rien et, veritablement, parole de 
personne (1994:72). (,Besides, who is speaking, behind those faces whose eyes, fixed on the 
teleprompter, pretend to be looking at you ... ? ... the discourse comes from nowhere; no sender 
claims it ... the receiver is also anonymous ... Words about nothing and, in truth, words belonging 
to nobody.' My translation.) 
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"grammatical" and "ungrammatical" involves a social value judgement of some kind, and it is 
idle to pretend otherwise' (1987:143). He gives the anti-prescriptive stance short shrift, saying 
there is no reason why prescriptive linguistics should not be 'scientific', just as 
there is no reason why prescriptive medicine should not be. But twentieth-century 
linguists, anxious to claim 'scientific' status for their new synchronic discipline, 
were glad enough to retain the old nineteenth-century whipping-boy of 
prescriptivism, in order thereby to distinguish their own concerns as 'descriptive', 
not 'prescriptive'. When the history of twentieth-century linguistics comes to be 
written, a naive, unquestioning faith in the validity of this distinction will 
doubtless be seen as one of the main factors in the academic sociology of the 
subject. (1980: 151-2) 
The condensed essence of Harris's critique can be found in his reply to his critics (1997), in 
which he describes his 'integrational' linguistics as 'a pragmatics of self-understanding and a 
basis for lay linguistic therapy rather than ... part of a university curriculum' (1997:310). 
There is an extensive literature of similar radical rethinkings and objections related to the 
question of value in linguistic theory. Some noteworthy examples, taking a variety of 
perspectives, are Robinson (1975) The New Grammarians' Funeral; Itkonen (1978) 
Grammatical TheOlY and Metascience, which explores the philosophical, logical and 
methodological issues of normativity in linguistic data; Roy Harris On redefining linguistics and 
Love The locus of languages in Davis and Taylor (1990); articles on Linguistic ideologies by 
Taylor, Crowley, Joseph and Cameron in Joseph and Taylor Ideologies of Language (1990:9-
93); Taylor (1997) Theorizing Language (in particular the chapter on Normativity and linguistic 
form; and Hutton (1998) Semantics and the 'etymologicalfallacy'fallacy. This last explores the 
way the linguist's synchronic/diachronic distinction excludes aspects of language the ordinary 
language user values. Hutton presents a convincing case for rethinking this distinction. He states 
that 'etymology and etymological awareness have played a key role in twentieth century politics 
of language' and suggests that linguists' attempts to ignore this fact 'reveal professionally 
constructed.... ignorance of the socio-political complexity of ideologies that make use of 
etymology, and intolerance of views that diverge from those of the academic expert'. He argues 
that etymological speculation is 'in a sense part of the language itself (1998: 195-99). Relevant 
also to questions oflanguage and value are two recent works which take new critical angles on 
Chomsky's generative linguistics and innatist theory oflanguage, Sampson (1999) Educating 
Eve, and Sampson (2001) Empirical Linguistics. 
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Finally, Halliday's writings and the body of systemic functional literature associated with these 
are an implicit (and occasionally explicit) critique of formal orthodox linguistics, putting 
criticism into practice by finding ways of talking about language that differ from those of 
orthodox theory. This literature is not reviewed here, because it is the rationale, justification and 
support system for the following chapters. 
2.2.4 PI"escriptivism debated on the air and in cyberspace 
It is of course not only in the published literature that the prescriptive/descriptive debate plays 
out. Prescriptivism is also a topic of interest on the air and in cyberspace. In a radio programme, 
Word of Mouth, which has been aired on South African English radio (SAjm) for many years, 
linguists serving as panellists tread a fine line between satisfying the listeners' demands for a 
prescriptive response to their questions and observing the anti-prescriptive tenets of their 
discipline. Space does not allow further discussion here of the relevance of such a programme 
to the debate and the problem of how to narrow the gap between the linguist and the lay language 
enthusiast. I will mention only that when panellists have occasionally tried to broach matters to 
do with theoretical linguistics, listeners have reacted in a way that can be gauged from the 
following letter sent to the presenter after a discussion of Chomsky and of Pinker's then new 
book (1994): 
DearMr Orr 
Because I have always been interested in language and phonetics I have rushed 
through my early morning ablutions every Sunday to enjoy your Word of Mouth 
programme - but I and many of my friends have found the last two Sundays a 
thorough bore, especially this last one. Please leave Tromski's very boring 
theories to be discussed elsewhere and allow your programme to be conducted by 
interesting schoolmasters and lecturers who discuss things of interest to normal 
speakers of English. Yours sincerely (illegible), Rosebank, 22 Sept. 1997. 
The age, nationality and social class of the correspondent can also be gauged from this; i.e. 
seventy-to-eighty (ablutions, schoolmasters), British expatriate, middle-class. Linguists are 
plainly handicapped in addressing this kind of audience, which has fixed ideas as to what it wants 
to hear about language: curiosities and correctnesses. As the presenter observed, essentially what 
the listeners wanted to hear was 'more of the same' (personal communication). 
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A completely different set of respondents, who did not want more of the same, debated the 
prescriptive/descriptive issues on an Internet forum, the Linguist List, from 9 May to 1 August 
1994, and again from 12 November 1997 to 27 January 1998. Each of these debates drew 
comments from some 50 linguists, about half of them from the United States, and the others from 
the UK, Germany, Spain, Norway, Bulgaria, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and South Africa. The debates are recorded in the Linguist List archives, and are an interesting 
record of recent opinion in unedited form. Cameron says she has 'profited throughout the writing 
of [her] book from regular forays into cyberspace' because 'people are very unguarded about 
expressing their views there, and [she] take [ s] those views as a useful indication of current 
concerns and the range of opinions they support - always with the proviso that net-users 
represent a fairly narrow social stratum' (1995: 237n.5). The Linguist List debates indicate that 
the anti-prescriptive approach occasions considerable malaise. The views expressed by the 
participants take the form of, on the one hand, intemperate dismissal of prescriptive concerns 
and, on the other, hesitant admission that linguists may have got some things wrong. As is 
characteristic ofInternet discussions, no consensus is reached, and the debates peter out without 
anything being said that might constitute a real answer to Cameron's question, which would 
mean rethinking the basic premises of orthodox linguistic theory. 
2.3 Introductory texts in linguistics 
To complete the survey of anti-prescriptive texts in 2.1.2, I have looked at what is likely to be the 
student's first encounter with the anti-prescriptive doctrine: the introductory text in linguistics. 
These texts merit separate discussion because, whereas the literature discussed above is primarily 
addressed to the converted, the introductory literature represents an interface between the worlds 
of the layperson and the linguist. I have drawn my observations from a survey of the way the 
topic of prescriptivism is introduced to beginners in sixteen introductory texts, British and 
American, published over some forty years: Hockett (1958), Hall (1964), Crystal (1971), 
Langacker(1973 [1967]), Lyons (1981), Hudson(1984), Aitchison (1987[1978]), Radford (1988), 
Finegan and Besnier (1989), Fromkin and Rodman (1993[1978]), Pinker (1994), Akmajian, 
Demers and Harnish (1995[1979]), Trask (1995), Napoli (1996), O'Grady, Dobrovolsky and 
Katamba (1997), and Radford, Atkinson, Britain, Clahsen and Spencer (1999). (I am aware of 
a certain unfairness in lumping these together: there is of course much variation in style and 
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approach amongst these texts. The lumping-together is justified only on the basis that all place 
considerable emphasis on the anti-prescriptive doctrine.) 
Many of these texts present the topic right at the beginning, and some devote a large number of 
pages to it. None of them omit it altogether. The one that has the least to say about it - only one 
paragraph on the subject - is Radford et al. (1999). All apparently believe that pointing out the 
prescriptive/ descriptive difference is essential as a basis for beginning to study linguistics. These 
texts are aimed primarily at students, but some are also intended for a wider readership, lay or 
academic. I have included Pinker (1994) because, despite not being designed as a textbook, it is 
being used by lecturers who find its popular style appeals to their students.4 The treatment of the 
topic varies depending on the amount of space given to the subject, the intended readership, and 
the degree of dogmatism ofthe author. I examined these texts in order of dates of publication but 
could discern no particular trend (linguists have been emphatic about this topic for the past forty 
years), 5 other than that the rhetoric of some of the more recent texts is quite extreme; particularly 
that ofFromkin and Rodman (1993), Pinker (1994), Trask (1995) and Napoli (1996), whereas 
some of earlier date take a more scholarly approach: Hall (1964), Crystal (1971) and Langacker 
(1973), for example, deal with the subject of prescriptivism in considerable depth and without 
over-simplifying the issues. Crystal observes that 'In contrasting a new approach with an old, it 
is all too easy to paint a picture in black and white, whereas the reality of the situation is in many 
shades of grey' (1971:39), and Finegan and Besnier (1989), in discussing prescriptivism in a 
final chapter, give some serious consideration to lay attitudes. My cursory survey necessarily 
risks over-generalization: not all the problems I mention are to be found in all of the texts I 
examined, but I believe the features I have identified are sufficiently typical to merit concern. I 
have illustrated mostly from those that use the most obvious techniques of persuasion. Space 
4 
For example, a person who lectures to 'elementary school teachers' writes that Pinker's book is 
'useful in getting across the message', and that 'by comparison, most of the class struggled 
through Halliday and Hasan, who much more than Pinker attempt to relate their theory to 
teaching' (Linguist List discussion, 22 June 1994, 5.761). 
Roy Harris describes this as 'the anti-prescriptivist witch-hunt in modem linguistics' (1987: 128). 
The increase in stridency can be clearly seen when comparing Fromkin and Rodman's 1993 
(fifth) edition with their 1978 (second) edition. The more recent edition makes 'prescriptive 
grammars' a separate section with bold heading, adds 'scare quotes', and has additional 
paragraphs on the subject and a cartoon illustrating the supposed foolishness of prescriptivists. 
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does not allow for discussion here of changing trends in the teaching oflinguistic theory over the 
past forty years, but I would link the increasing emphasis on anti-prescriptivism in the texts I 
examined to the trend that de Beaugrande has observed: the way that 'recent Kuhnian textbooks 
invest steadily greater effort and hyperbole in making the development of linguistics fit one 
"normal" paradigm' (1991 :369n.2). 
Besides its obvious function of providing instruction, the introductory text also functions as a rite 
of passage into a new social group. It thus provides evidence of the process by which adherents 
of the lay theory of language, which is primarily prescriptive, are persuaded to abandon their 
beliefs and adopt a new way of seeing language. Christie (1999a) discusses this kind of initiatory 
process in another setting. Referring to Bernstein's model of the pedagogical process (I996), and 
exemplifying from the discourse of the English literature classroom, she shows how instructional 
discourse is reinforced by regulative discourse6 and how, by being obliged to satisfy evaluative 
criteria, the student is 'apprenticed to the ideal pedagogic subject position' (I 999a: 178). She 
points out that' evaluation is the key to pedagogic practice' (1999a: 160) and demonstrates that 
in the literary classroom its 'purpose is to develop certain moral positionings' (1999a: 172). The 
process that is revealed in the introductory linguistics texts listed above appears to be similar: 
linguists writing for students are not only teaching them methods of describing language but also, 
and crucially to the success of these methods, inculcating in them a particular value system. This 
value system is the belief in 'the scientific method', tending to a naive positivism (echoing 
Hudson's 'Issue' l(a), which states that linguists 'take language as it is', 1981:335). The 
regulative element in the text, suggesting that linguistics reveals the facts rather than just one 
possible construal of those 'facts', discourages individual response (which is of course further 
curtailed by the assessment process). Wolf and Love observe that 
6 
Although linguistics tends to present itself as a culture-neutral science of 
language, the enterprise is based not on ab initio consideration of the phenomena 
under investigation, but on a projection of certain preoccupations about language 
derived from a particular tradition of linguistic thought. (1997: 1) 
Halliday uses the terms exposition and injunction for these two kinds of discourse (I994a:390). 
Instructional discourse is description and explanation, while regulative is the kind designed to 
persuade and control. The relationship between the two and the ways they combine are 
exhaustively analysed in Halliday's 'silver' text (1994a:368-91). 
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Introductory texts, therefore, while purporting simply to pass on scientific knowledge, are 
indoctrinating students into a belief system. This phenomenon has been commented on by 
Lawson, who observes that 
Theoretically 'neutral' introductory linguistics textbooks often act as vehicles of 
indoctrination into a certain theoretical viewpoint; not only is the text's ideology 
apparent in the first chapter, but what that theory sees as its antithesis is also 
revealed and argued against. (200 1: 1) 
An important preliminary step in the process of indoctrination is persuading the student that the 
traditional prescriptive approach is wrong, as Cameron observes: 
The very first thing any student of linguistics learns is that 'linguistics is 
descriptive, not prescriptive' - concerned, in the way of all science, with 
objective facts and not subjective value judgements. Prescriptivism thus 
represents the threatening Other, the forbidden; it is a spectre that haunts 
linguistics and a difference that defines linguistics. (1995: 5) 
In the following section I consider some of the salient features of these texts, first examining the 
picture that is built up of the linguist's difference and separateness from the ordinary language 
user, and difference from grammarians of the past, and then identifYing some of the features of 
the regulative register that appear in these texts, revealing the way the genre combines 
indoctrination with instruction. 
A major concern of these texts is to reject the image of the prescriptive traditional grammarian 
and replace it with that of the linguist as the detached scientist: 
The reason why present-day linguists are so insistent about the distinction 
between descriptive and prescriptive rules is simply that traditional grammar was 
very strongly normative in character. The grammarian saw it as his task to 
formulate the_standards of correctness and to impose these, if necessary, upon the 
speakers of the language. (Lyons 1981:48) 
The notion of absolute and unchanging 'correctness' is quite foreign to linguists . 
... A linguist would note with interest, rather than horror, the fact that you can 
have your hair washed and set in a glamorama in North Carolina, or your car oiled 
at a lubritorium in Sydney, or that you can buy apples at a fruitique in a trendy 
suburb of London. (Aitchison 1987:13) 
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The emphasis on the new, scientific approach tends to obscure the fact that all grammatical 
analysis today owes a debt to earlier grammarians. Much of the 'strongly normative character' 
that linguists object to is most evident in isolated shibboleths, which unfortunately distract from 
the real achievements of the past. When referring to traditional grammar, introductory texts focus 
on a narrow range of prescriptive grammatical dislikes, such as split infinitives, double negatives, 
between you and I, who for whom, shall and will not differentiated, like used as a conjunction, 
due to as a prepositional phrase, prepositions at the end of sentences, and so on. A favourite is 
the argument over It is I versus It's me, which is mentioned, for example, by Hockett (1958:5), 
by Akmajian et al. (1995:5) and by Lyons (1981:61), and prompts a whole paragraph of 
fulminations by Trask (,bizarre invention', 'cobbled together', 'ridiculous campaign'; 1995: 160-
1). The examples are similar to those on Crystal's list of the top ten 'pet hates' from a 1986 
survey of letters to a BBC language programme: 1. between you and I; 2. split infinitives; 3. 
misplaced only; 4. none followed by a plural verb; 5. different to/than; 6. sentences ending with 
prepositions; 7. incorrect use of shall and will; 8. hopefully used as sentence modifier; 9. who 
where it should be whom; 10. double negatives (Crystal 1995:194). The public have become 
unduly sensitized to these particular points of grammar, and the authors of the introductory texts 
seem just as excessively aware of them. Unfortunately, the linguist's harping on these minor 
niggles sends the message that all evaluation oflanguage is foolish, and this obscures legitimate 
worries about language, and distracts students from giving proper consideration to the role of 
evaluation in linguistic theory. 
It also distracts from proper consideration of the roots of linguistics, starting with the classical 
grammarians. Robins suggests that 'almost every textbook of English grammar bears evidence 
of a debt to Thrax' (1990:35), and he devotes thirteen pages to description of the Techne-
Grammatike- and works arising from it, concluding that the achievement of the ancient Greek 
grammarians 'is strong enough to deserve and to sustain critical examination. It is also such as 
to inspire our gratitude and admiration' (1990:47). He says that it is appropriate to reflect 
sympathetically on 
the very great achievements of successive generations of Greek scholars in 
devising and systematizing a formal terminology for the description of the 
classical Greek language as it was written and read aloud (and they set their sights 
no higher), a terminology which ... became the foundation for nearly two 
thousand years of grammatical theory .... From the resources of a language not 
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previously required to embody precise metalinguistic statements the Greeks had 
hammered out ... a detailed and articulated technical vocabulary for grammatical 
description. (1990:46) 
This terminology includes such things as 'precise and correct observations' on phonetics, a rich 
description of morphology, distinction of word classes, analysis of sentence structures and 
description of syntactic relations and semantic functions (Robins 1990: 11-47), building the 
foundations for all grammatical description to follow. Crystal (1971) is unusual amongst the 
introductory texts in giving the beginner a balanced picture of the place of traditional grammar: 
It is true that many features of traditional theories and descriptions of language 
have proved to be unhelpful or positively misleading, and one of the main stimuli 
for the development oflinguistics was a reaction against this. On the other hand, 
it is equally true that many of the principles and procedures of modern linguistics 
are foreshadowed - sometimes only implicitly, but sometimes in chasteningly 
explicit detail - in the work of earlier scholars .... When linguistics began to 
develop in the early decades of this century, there was a natural and reasonable 
reaction against much of traditional study. This, however, led to many of the 
valuable insights of this study being ignored or their importance minimized. 
(1971:39) 
This contrasts with others that emphasize dismissal: 
a new approach to English grammar ... inevitably implies a radical house-
cleaning .... There are a great many rules of old-fashioned prescriptive grammar 
that need to be swept into the dustbin ... (Hall 1964:442) 
Many introductory texts give the impression that it is only now that linguists are getting things 
right. Aitchison dismisses the classical grammarians in one sentence: 'This attitude [i.e. the 
prescriptive emphasis on the best written language] began as far back as the 2nd century B.C. 
when scholars in Alexandria took the authors of 5th-century Greece as their models'. She says 
that 'this belief in the superiority of the written word has continued for over two millennia', but 
'linguists regard the spoken language as primary, not the written' (1987:13-14). This last 
statement shows how an evaluation may be tucked away within apparently objective language, 
so that students feel they are reading a 'scientific' text, and are unaware of being subtly 
positioned to accept a certain viewpoint. To say that spoken language is primary could of course 
just mean that it comes first, chronologically, in the individual and in the species; which would 
be an objective, though banal, statement. But to regard spoken language as primary implies an 
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evaluation; here primary means 'first in importance'. However, Aitchison does not use the 
wording 'linguists regard the spoken language as more important than the written', because that 
would be too obviously evaluative, and primary has a suitably technical ring to it. Thus the 
student learns to relegate concerns with written language to second place, not as an evaluative 
choice but as a scientifically objective procedure, an advance on the mistakes of the past. 7 
The targeting of petty details of prescriptive grammar suggests that discrediting earlier opinions 
is the main concern of some of these authors - referred to by Lawson as 'rites oflegitimization' 
(Bourdieu's term), 'the killing of one's linguistic "fathers'" (2001:10). The dismissal of the 
achievements of the past discourages the student from intelligently assessing what earlier 
grammarians did or did not achieve. Robinson, however, is of the opinion that 
Chomsky's contribution is small by comparison with the advances made in 
Athens and Alexandria and represented in the security, the commonplaces of 
words like our verb, noun, sentence, word, but that is the common fate of genuine 
contributors to an established discipline. (1975:35)8 
Restoring the balance like this might give students a sense of proportion and free them to 
question new ideas. Instead, we have a situation where many may well know nothing about 
traditional grammar except that it is 'the bad stuffwe have been taught to reject'. To take an 
example, Finegan and Besnier, explaining transformations in generative grammar, say that 
'Traditional grammars discuss imperative sentences as having an 'understood' you as subject' 
and they then turn to the (improved) generative explanation: 'In some transformational analyses 
of grammar, this understood subject is accounted for by postulating you in the underlying 
structure and deleting it by a transformational rule' (1989: 155). A student who had not been 
coached to accept the equation 'traditional grammar = bad, unscientific grammar' might want 
to argue that the technicality of the new explanation adds nothing very helpful, and serves only 
7 
This analysis is not intended to imply Machiavellian cunning on the part of Jean Aitchison. It is, 
on the contrary, a major argument of this thesis that linguists are not sufficiently aware of the 
extent to which the theory they espouse is a construct of their own use of language. 
8 
De Beaugrande contrasts Newmeyer's claim that 'on the basis of [Chomsky's] idealization, more 
has been learned about the nature oflanguage in the last 25 years than in the previous 2500' 
(1980:250) with Firth's 'to dismiss two thousand years oflinguistic study in Asia as well as in 
Europe ... is just plain stupid' (1957:139) (1991:369). 
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to dehumanize language. It might be argued that the traditional way of understanding the 
imperative mood is better, because it includes the interpersonal meaning. If ordered to 'Take out 
the garbage', the addressee might ask 'Who are you telling to take out the garbage?' and the 
answer would be 'I am telling you to take out the garbage', which'is a reasonable demonstration 
that the speaker's sentence did indeed have an understood you as subject. That the word 'you' 
is superfluous has a contextual explanation - we know very well that it is the recipient of the 
message who is being thus instructed (he or she is being addressed by a speaker, or reading a 
notice or set of instructions). But instead of talking in terms of speakers meaning things the 
student has been conditioned to talk in terms of (bits oj) language doing things, autonomously: 
'The reflexive transformation requires the presence of the subject NP ... If the imperative 
transformation were to apply first ... it would delete the subject NP you .. .' and so on (Finegan 
and Besnier 1989:156). 
Students who learn to describe language in terms offormal rules are unlikely to question whether 
there might be better ways: the very possibility of evaluation is eliminated by the claim that 
evaluation has been eliminatedfrom the linguist's description. Instead of being encouraged to 
develop some sense of the history of the discipline, some variety of perspective and versatility 
of approach, and a healthy scepticism in regard to the latest methods, students are put under 
heavy pressure by many of these texts, particularly the more recent, to favour the new. Napoli 
(1996), for example, is touted by its back-cover blurb as 'unique among texts today in that it 
brings the reader face-to-face with current cutting-edge theories'. This is an example of the 
regulative register 'projecting' the instructional (as discussed below) - particularly as the back-
cover blurb is often the section of a book that is read first. 
Linked to the dismissal of past achievements is a narrow Anglocentric view of history, which 
treats prescriptivism as a peculiar aberration of English. Where introductory texts do give some 
historical background, the focus is on the 18th century in England. One example of such 
background is a paragraph in Pinker's chapter on 'The Language Mavens' - not an unbiased 
account: 'The scandal of the language mavens began in the eighteenth century ... increasingly 
fastidious rules that no refined person could afford to ignore ... hobgoblins ... these eighteenth 
century fads' (1994:373-4). As it is likely that all languages have preferred and dispreferred 
forms that speakers insist on (Thomas 1991), some discussion of prescriptivism in languages 
other than English might provide a more balanced view of the phenomenon. Trask is one who 
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does mention purism in other languages and at other times ( Spain, France, Italy, ancient Rome), 
but with the intention of pouring scorn on 'a body of conservative opinion' that complains about 
'ugly, sloppy, illiterate new usages' (1995: 165) rather than of considering why this way of talking 
about language persists, despite linguists' best efforts, and whether it might have a linguistic as 
well as a social function. 
A major concern in these texts, then, is to emphasize the difference oflinguistics from past forms 
of language study: 
It is important to stress the differences between this approach and the views of 
language to which you are likely to have been exposed at school. (Hudson 
1984:8) 
One frequently meets people who think that linguistics is old school grammar 
jazzed up with a few new names. But it differs in several basic ways. (Aitchison 
1987:12) 
Having detached linguistics from its past, the introductory texts go on to detach the linguist from 
everyday concerns, painting a picture of a scientist who is unlike ordinary language users: 
First, and most important, linguistics is descriptive, not prescriptive. Linguists 
are interested in what is said, not what they think ought to be said. They describe 
language in all its aspects, but do not prescribe rules of 'correctness' .... The 
notion of absolute and unchanging 'correctness' is quite foreign to linguists. 
(Aitchison 1987:12-13; emphases in original); In sharp contrast, when linguists 
speak of rules, they are not referring to rules from grammar books. (Akmajian et 
al.1995 :7); To a linguist or psycholinguist, of course, language is like the song of 
the humpback whale (Pinker 1994:370); To a scientist, the fundamental fact of 
human language is its sheer improbability. (Pinker 1994:371) 
Contributing to this distancing effect is the 'straw man' technique of singling out for attack a 
small selection of the most intransigent prescriptivists and the most absurd of their concerns: 
Today our bookshops are filled with books by language "purists" ... Edwin 
Newman, for example ... rails against those who use the word hopefully to mean 
"I hope" ... (Fromkin and Rodman 1993: 15); Prescriptive grammarians have ... 
declared that it is ungrammatical to say It's me, and that the only acceptable form 
is It's 1. ... Can you imagine looking at a bad photograph of yourself and 
exclaiming Good heavens! Is that really I? (Trask 1995:160) 
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The American film critic John Simon is the prototypical target, as his virulent prose is easy to 
criticize. Pinker, for example, rightly points out the tastelessness of Simon's comment that 'The 
English language is being treated nowadays exactly as slave traders once handled the 
merchandise in their slave ships, or as the inmates of concentratlon camps were dealt with by 
their Nazi jailers' (1981:97, quoted in Pinker 1994:385). However, Pinker is not above tasteless 
comparisons himself: 'the [prescriptive] rules survive by the same dynamic that perpetuates ritual 
genital mutilations and college fraternity hazing' (1994:374). Antagonism to the prescriptive 
approach is seen to warrant name-calling, for example: 
very many worthy persons ... "saviors" of the English language (Fromkin and 
Rodman 1993: 15); transparently insane ... self-appointed experts ... ignorant or 
crazy ... little group of fanatics ... (Trask 1995:160-1); Maven, shmaven! 
Kibbitzers and nudniks is more like it (Pinker 1994:373); the jeremiads [sic] 
wailing about how sloppy language leads to sloppy thought are themselves 
hairballs of loosely associated factoids and tangled non-sequiturs. (Pinker 
1994:399) 
It ironic that the claim to be a dispassionate scientist is accompanied in texts such as Pinker's by 
persuasive rhetoric of the most impassioned kind. A personal style is appropriate for addressing 
beginners, but some of these writers lose their scientific detachment when criticizing the 
prescriptivists for being unscientific. Others, however, take a detached approach, treating 
prescriptivism as a subject worthy of study in itself Hockett, for example, suggests that: 'A 
particular linguist may become interested in the whole phenomenon of correctness, and may 
study this in the same objective way he might examine Greek verbs ... ' (1958:5).This is more 
'scientific', but it has the effect of creating distance; putting the linguist on a different plane from 
the ordinary language user, who comes perilously close to being treated as a laboratory specimen. 
Hockett does not deny that' as a user oflanguage, the linguist is bound by the same conventions 
of his society as everyone else is', nor does he 'deny the reality of the distinction between correct 
and incorrect': it is just that 'the linguist is not particularly interested in such questions' (1958:5). 
This is to distance the linguist not only from ordinary language users, but also from him/herself 
as an ordinary language user, leading to the' split personality syndrome' which I discuss further 
in Chapter Three. 
I move on now to discuss some rhetorical features of these texts, using Christie's method of 
analysis, mentioned above. She refers to a suggestion of Halliday' s that a text may be considered 
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metaphorically as functioning like a clause. Bernstein (1996) uses the clause grammar concept 
of embedding: seeing the instructional discourse as being contained within the regulative, as one 
clause may be contained within another. Christie prefers to conceptualise the regulative register 
as projecting the instructional (l999a: 160-1): 'the secondary clause is projected through the 
primary clause, which instates it as a locution or an idea' (Halliday 1994a:219). She finds a 
parallel to this process in the English literature classroom, where the regulative register will be 
foregrounded at the beginning of a course and remain foregrounded while the teacher's goals are 
being made clear and becoming accepted by the students, after which the instructional register 
will come to the fore, and the regulative may disappear (though continuing to operate implicitly). 
The idea of embedding focuses on the difficulty of separating the two registers, whereas 
Christie's representation of the relationship as one of projection focuses on the fact that there is 
a sender of the instruction, reminding us that the instruction is not a self-generated entity: 
TABLE 2.3 Projecting clauses 
I think the answer is jorty-Mo. I believe language is an instinct. 
projecting clause projected clause projecting clause projected clause 
regulative instructional regulative instructional 
Hers is therefore a better description for the purpose of my argument, because it calls attention 
to the fact that a human being's values and beliefs are involved in the instruction. (It is interesting 
to note that Wolf and Love, quoted above, also use the word projection, in a non-technical sense, 
to describe this involvement, as does Roy Harris, quoted in Chapter One, above, 1987: 130.) 
Halliday describes the notion of projection as 'the logico-semantic relationship whereby a clause 
comes to function not as a direct representation of (non-linguistic) experience but as a 
representation ofa (linguistic) representation' (1994a:250), i.e. not The answer isjorty-Mo, but 
I think II the answer is forty-Mo. His definition reminds us that the projected clause is twice 
removed from direct experience. Ifwe conceptualize the genre of 'introductory text' as based on 
the same kind of construal as a proj ecting clause, then this should warn us against being too ready 
to accept it as 'pure description', an objective representation of reality. 
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In Christie's data (1999a), regulative discourse includes such locutions as: 'I want you to ah, look 
at the part ... '; I really want you to know .. .'; Right, now it's crucial...'; And I think what I want 
you to know is ... " and apart from these obviously regulative devices she lists numerous other 
grammatical features that work to build shared comprehension, shared interpretation and shared 
judgement (Christie 1999a: 166-7). Of the introductory texts I surveyed, the one that most clearly, 
even exaggeratedly, foregrounds the regulative register is Napoli (1996). This author has 
apparently tried to recreate in her text the feeling of being physically present in her class and 
being personally addressed, so her language contains many features characteristic of typically 
spoken rather than written style: second person pronoun, colloquialisms, imperatives, and 
teacher-style interrogatives (questions to which the teacher knows the answer, not genuine ones, 
and questions whose function is to check to see the class is still 'with her'): 
Okay, let's move on .. .'; 'What type of morpheme is each7'; 'we'll talk about 
diminutives later'; 'Let's go on now ... '; 'What steps do you think ... 7'; 'Do you 
see how ... 7'; 'Okay, now make a list of nouns ... Keep going. And going. And 
going.'; 'Be careful ... ' [and so on] (1996:183-187) 
These locutions are similar to the ones Christie (1999a) records. However, where they are quite 
natural in her data (teacher-talk for secondary students), their use in the written mode for tertiary 
students is decidedly marked. 
A prime position in a text from which regulative discourse can project the instructional is of 
course the preface. 9 Napoli's is addressed alternately to students and to teachers, and it 
emphasizes the importance of an introductory course in linguistics: 
9 
Face the facts: Most people who study linguistics take only a single course in it 
- the introductory course. The introduction-to-linguistics course at an institution 
should, therefore, be the one the most effort goes into, not the least. It should 
supply as comprehensive a vision of the core of linguistics as possible. This is a 
teacher's one shot at most people - a linguist's one chance to get them to 
understand how language works. Please, let's take careful aim. (1996:vi) 
Of course, projection is not defined or recognized by its position in a clause or text; the concept 
is logico-semantic, not structural (Halliday 1994a:2S0). 
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The tenor of the last two sentences does not manifest confidence that the facts will speak for 
themselves, and in fact the author is quite open about 'selling' an angle on the facts: 
What defines the field of linguistics is not just the material that linguists study, 
but the way they look at data, the manner in which they argue, and the range of 
conclusions they find sensible .... Linguists ... have an unmistakable mindset, and 
this book tries to give you an insight into a linguist's way oflooking. (1996:vii) 
It is Napoli's mindset that projects the knowledge she is trying to put across, and colours it 
strongly, in the same way that the literature teacher Christie studied was not just putting a text 
in front of the students and asking them to look at it objectively, but was projecting it through the 
way he himself wanted it to be read. However, nowhere in the data Christie quotes does the 
literature teacher harangue his students the way Napoli does her readers: 'You tell me: If you can 
remember a time when someone corrected your speech in your native language, who was that 
person? Did that person explain why what you said was in need of correction? Did that person 
explain why the alternative offered was better?' (1996:293), nor does he use overt emotional 
blackmail as Napoli does, commenting on educational inequity in the US: 'And if you're enraged 
at that fact, again, join the club' (1996:294). It is almost impossible to isolate examples of the 
purely instructional register from Napoli's text, as the regulative projects virtually every 
paragraph. The following are examples from just two pages on semantic features: 
Now, I mentioned ... Do you think ... Before you answer that ... Let's look at an 
even more drastic case ... I'm not trying to argue that ... we might well be 
surprised ... Thus I believe it is worthwhile ... Yes, gender matters here ... please 
try not to let your ideas about societal structure influence your answer ... Okay, 
let's return to ... Consider... Arrange ... Can you figure out?' (1996 :464-5) 
Fromkin and Rodman (1993), in contrast, confme the explicitly regulative discourse to two 
chapters, Chapter 1 (What is Language?), with sections on Linguistic Knowledge and 
Performance, Descriptive Grammars, Prescriptive Grammars, and so on, and Chapter 7 
(Language in Society), with sections on The "Standard", Language Purists, BannedLanguages, 
Black English, Language and Sexism, and so on. Most of this book is in the instructional register: 
'Rule a states that a Verb Phrase can be a Verb followed by a Noun Phrase' (1993:88); 
'Languages with OVS, OSV and VOS basic word order are much rarer' (1993:111); 'the 
nonnasal or oral stops are also called plosives .. .' (1993: 193), and so on. However, as Christie 
points out 'while the instructional register comes to be foreground ed, the regulative register 
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continues to operate tacitly' and 'the success with which the instructional register comes to the 
fore is a measure of the continuing implicit operation of the regulative register' (1993: 161). In 
teaching linguistics this is particularly true, because every theory oflinguistics construes the data 
from its particular angle, and it is only by being persuaded to take the desired angle that the 
student can be taught to see the object the instructor sees. Napoli's book, for example, 'is about 
the structure oflanguage, ... not about the structure of society' (1996:295), and so the student is 
regulated to see language as structure independent of meaning. As Christie observes, 'the 
evaluative rules transform the pedagogic discourse into practice, creating the field of 
reproduction of knowledge, and the associated process of acquisition' (1999a: 160). 
In the texts I examined, the ratio of regulative to instructional discourse varies, and the regulative 
is realized by a wide variety of evaluative resources, not all of them linguistic. One of the most 
immediately evident is the use of typographical features, such as bold-facing: 
Equality: all grammars are equal (O'Grady et aI. 1997:6, heading); linguistics 
is descriptive, not pI'escriptive (O'Grady et a1.l997:6); The contrast that is 
relevant here is the one that holds between describing how things are and 
prescl'ibing how things ought to be (Lyons 1981 :47); linguistics is descriptive, 
not prescriptive (Aitchison 1987: 12); this curious but very widespread view is 
called prescriptivism (Trask 1995: 160); the important thing is that it describes, 
not prescribes (Napoli 1996:293);Our reasons for choosing a standard have 
nothing, in fact, to do with the structure of language per se (Napoli 
1996:294); all varieties of a given language are equally good so far as 
linguistics is concerned. (Napoli 1996:295) 
Bold-face serves to draw attention to key pairs in these texts. Descriptive and prescriptive are 
identified as strongly favoured and strongly disfavoured, and other pairs, such as competence 
and performance (Fromkin and Rodman 1993: 11-12) and synchronic and diachronic 
(Aitchison 1987: 18), being typographically marked in the same way, are likely to be similarly 
assessed by the student. Other typographical resources for persuasion are 'scare quotes': 
the 'best authors' of classical times (Aitchison 1987: 13); the linguist is bound to 
observe and record 'incorrect' forms as well as 'correct' ones (Hockett 1958:5); 
the "prestige dialect"; using it "properly"; language "purists"; (Fromkin and 
Rodman 1993: 15); the' correct' way to speak these two languages. (Radford et 
a1.l999: 17) 
and the occasional exclamation mark: 
48 
a certain self-styled socio-cultural elite (= pedants!) (Radford 1988:7); we do not 
use prescriptive terminology such as 'correct/incorrect' (yes, that is a prescriptive 
statement!) (Radford 1988:8); And traditional grammar, after all, had its origins 
in the description of the literary dialects of Ancient Greece! (Lyons 1981:50) 
A powerful yet subtle regulative device is Fromkin and Rodman's use of multi-modality. Their 
section on Prescriptive Grammars begins with a cartoon (1993:14) showing an archetypal 
pedant schoolmaster attempting to correct the English being spoken by a smart young female 
student and ending up looking foolish. The schoolmaster is balding and moustached, wearing a 
tweed jacket, bow tie, glasses and a solemn expression. The young woman has blonde hair in an 
attractive bob and is wearing a close-fitting mini-skirted dress, fishnet tights and a cheerful 
expression. As the three frames progress from left to right, the master is increasingly 
backgrounded, becoming smaller and smaller, while the young woman comes closer and becomes 
larger. In the final frame, the schoolmaster's words are in smaller print, and no longer in a bubble 
intruding on her speaker bubble, giving the impression that he is now left mumbling to himself 
in the background. The impact of the cartoon is increased by its prestigious location near the 
beginning of the first chapter of a widely-used introductory text. Plainly such an illustration has 
little to do with teaching the objective description oflanguage and much to do with promoting 
an ideology: it is difficult to argue with an image, and to argue with this particular one would 
place the objector in the same camp as the tiresome old schoolmaster. 
Of the linguistic methods of persuasion in these texts, the most obvious is explicitly evaluative 
lexis, some of it strident: 
loud howls went up from outraged purists (Hall 1964:9); guardians of the English 
language; elitist (Fromkin and Rodman 1993: 15-16); transparently insane (Trask 
1995:160); so browbeaten by the 'experts' that they self-consciously trot out 
comical locutions (Trask 1995: 161);We would all be better off if these ridiculous 
and wrong-headed notions could be dumped on the scrap heap and forgotten. 
(Trask 1995: 162) 
and some of it mild: 
this complacency, and an atmosphere of fallacious dogma (Crystal 1971:38); 
misplaced terminological pedantry (Lyons 1981:46); the liberating effects of 
taking a descriptive approach to language (Hudson 1984:8); the bad old days of 
prescriptive grammar (Hudson 1984: 57); fundamental misconceptions; muddled 
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thinking; the uninformed (Radford 1988:7-8); some imaginary scale of 
superiority; all varieties of language are absolutely equal as instruments of 
communication and thought (O'Grady et al. 1997:6); The views of lay people 
about language are often quite simplistic. (Radford et al. 1999: 17) 
In some of these texts the effect of the evaluative lexis is subtle and unlikely to call itself to the 
reader's conscious attention. Hockett, for example, says that 'there are several points which often 
make trouble for the beginner. ... in part ... they have to do with the difference between the lay 
attitude towards language and the orientation of the specialist' (1958:3-4). It is the contrastive 
lexis that validates the linguist's position: he or she has an orientation, whereas the layperson has 
only an attitude. The British National Corpus (BNC) reveals some of the company these two 
words keep, and this data helps demonstrate how the student is being conditioned to adopt the 
desired view of the difference between the linguist and the layperson. A search for orientation 
finds 1049 instances; for attitude, 6012. Attitude is about six times more common: it is an 
everyday word. Fifty samples (randomly selected by the BNC quick search facility) reveal its use 
in a range of contexts, spoken and written, informal and formal, some bureaucratic. Only one is 
technical. Interestingly, about a third ofthe usages (16 out of 50) are recognizably negative, many 
preceded by a negative Epithet. Some examples are: alan unhealthy / lax / derogatory / 
unfavourable / negligent and Philistine / overbearing / anti-female / dictatorial attitude. The fifty 
samples randomly selected for orientation are almost all from formal written contexts: technical, 
scientific, academic and clinical. There is no evidence of negative colouring; the usages are 
neutral, and in many instances are preceded by a Classifier: alan axial/grain / compass / task 
/ relative domain / people / library and information / visual/sexual/homosexual / cultural / 
religious / political/empirical/theoretical / philosophical orientation. 10 The following samples 
give an idea of the two typical registers: 
10 
His attitude to England seems terribly confused, as one might expect from a 
person who despises royalty but brandishes the cross of St George. (CHB 2606 
New Musical Express) 
With translucent or transparent rocks, the depth of field of low power zoom 
binocular microscopes can be used advantageously for three-dimensional study 
of included bioclasts and replacement fabrics in cherts, and orientation of fluid 
and crystal inclusions in evaporites. (H9S 561 Techniques in Sedimentology) 
Epithet and Classifier are functional grammar terms, Halliday (1994a: 184ff.). 
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This brief display of the collocations of the two words reveals the motivation for Hockett's (no 
doubt unconscious) choice and the likely regulative effect on the learner: he or she is being taught 
that the lay approach is grounded in the everyday and may have negative connotations, while the 
linguist's is scientific, technical and dispassionate. 
Lexis is of course not the only or even the prime regulative method in these texts. Those which 
are most obviously directing the reader's sympathies make much use of Mood choices other than 
declarative; choices that are particularly marked in academic text: 
How can this be so? (Trask 1995:160); why should a usage which seems so 
natural and unremarkable to most of the population attract such hostility from the 
rest? (Trask 1995: 163); Why do some people say that ain't is not only 
substandard but not even a word? It most certainly is a word ... So what could 
anyone mean to call it a nonword? Why would someone want to ban this word 
from speech?(Napoli 1996:294); Why am I doing this? (Napoli 1996:295); Let's 
begin with a fundamental question (Napoli 1996:293); let's stick to the history of 
things for a moment; Face the facts (Napoli 1996:vi); now make a list of nouns 
(Napoli 1996: 183); Obviously you need to build in some kind of rules, but what 
kind? Prescriptive rules? Imagine trying to build a talking machine by designing 
it to obey rules like 'Don't split infinitives' ... (Pinker 1994:371) 
Finally, to round off this list of the more immediately noticeable regulative resources, I will 
mention the intrusive interpersonal remarks to be found in some of the texts that address the 
reader directly in the first person: 
And that, I am convinced, is the driving force behind the campaign for whom 
(Trask 1995: 162); I hope to have convinced you of two things (Pinker 1994:400); 
I suppose I must explain that it means "unbiased" (Pinker 1994:402); The 
question,~, makes no sense to you. (Napoli 1996:294) 
I have highlighted the overt evaluative techniques in some of these texts, but on the whole the 
genre is characterized by the unmodalized categorical statements typical of instructional 
discourse. This unhedged style is in some cases also used to present opinion as fact. Bloor and 
Bloor review some research that suggests that writers presenting new and controversial views 
seldom make 'bald, confident statements' (1995:231-2), but there are many of these statements 
in these texts (suggesting perhaps that these writers consider their views to be uncontroversial), 
for example, on the nature of linguistics: 
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linguistics ... is descriptive ... it describes what is rather than what ought to be ... 
descriptive linguistics is non-judgemental, it does not make judgements (Hudson 
1984: 7 -8); linguistics is descriptive, not prescriptive (Aitchison 1987: 12); 
Linguists object to prescriptivism (Fromkin and Rodman 1993: 16); Prescriptivists 
also condemn perfectly normal utterances (Trask 1995: 161); the important thing 
is that it describes, not prescribes. (NapoliI996:293) . 
and on the nature of language: 
Language is not a cultural artifact (Pinker 1994: 18); The complexity oflanguage 
... is part of our biological birthright; language is the product of a well-engineered 
biological instinct (Pinker 1994: 19); The Language Instinct (Pinker 1994 - title); 
No grammar, therefore no language, is either superior or inferior to any other 
(Fromkin and Rodman 1993:14); all known languages are at a similar level of 
complexity and detail (Akmajian 1995:8); all varieties oflanguage are absolutely 
equal. (O'Grady et a1. 1997:6) 
In these texts such statements can be made with confidence because the regulative register is 
broadly present in the overall framing of the text. Lawson points out the power of controlling 
metaphors that underlie a text for beginners and 'prepare the reader to view language in a certain 
way' (2001:13).11 Pinker's treatment of language as an 'instinct' is a particularly powerful 
example of such a frame, and framing all these introductory texts is the idea of' science' . Another 
powerful frame is 'political correctness'. Such frames can effectively restrict what might be 
considered proper topics of discussion; it is the way writers 'insulate their viewpoint from 
meaningful dissent' (Lawson 2001: 14) .12 In the first paragraph of the preface of Napoli (1996) 
the student is in effect warned that there are limitations on what may be considered acceptable 
ways of talking about language: 'Some of our most damaging racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
prejudices are based on our linguistic ignorance and our utterly stupid ideas about language' 
11 
Lawson targets in particular the metaphor of 'language as biology', pointing out that 'the very 
first words in both these texts [Lyons (1981) and O'Grady et al. (1989)] make an explicit link 
between biology and language' (2001:9). Other introductory texts he discusses are Hockett 
(1958), Pinker (1994) and Fromkin and Rodman (1998). It is interesting to note that the 
regulative approach he identifies - the emphasis on the biological basis of language - coincides 
with insistence on anti-prescriptivism. 
12 
The idea of the instructional asjramed by the regulative is a metaphorical variation on the idea 
of its being embedded in or projected by the regulative. Framing seems to me a less satisfactory 
metaphor than embedding and projection, because these are concepts drawn from the grammar. 
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(1996:v), which sends the clear message that the first thing to learn in linguistics is not to be 
found guilty ofharbouring any of those. Radford also puts the reader in a position where to argue 
would look foolish: 'it is hard to see how anyone could defend the prescriptive approach' 
(1988:8). 
Christie observes that 'Students feel the force of the moral imperative at work on them, and 
sometimes challenge it' (1999a: 175). She recounts how the teacher she observed was prepared 
to listen to students who argued, but not to change his mind about the rightness ofthe world view 
he was persuading them to take up; the students who were successful were those who did indeed 
'take up particular values and adopt particular perspectives' (1999a: 173) and reproduce them in 
written answers. Students encountering the orthodox doctrine that' all languages are equal' might 
want to argue, but their chances of success in the discipline could be severely curtailed should 
they do so. 
One reason for the success of the pedagogical process represented by these texts is, ironically, 
that students initiated into the social group of linguists working in the generative-formalist 
paradigm (which is the model most of these books are teaching) are being taught a theory that 
does not equip them to analyse how language is being used to fit them for membership. Because 
this theory puts the evaluative elements of language out of bounds and reifies language as an 
object separate from and largely beyond the control of its users (in fact, control, associated with 
the prescriptive model, is actively discouraged), students cannot make any use of their new 
scientific understanding of language to examine the way the (often thoroughly unscientific) 
language of the introductory books is being used to control them. 
Christie (1999a) argues that English studies are aimed at inculcating values in students rather 
than teaching them explicit, replicable methods of analysis. It is therefore to be expected that 
regulative discourse would predominate in the teaching of literature. What is surprising is that 
the teaching of linguistics, which purports to be scientific and objective, should also rely heavily 
on the regulative resources of language. The adoption by some of these authors of the 
prescriptivists' own tendency to belittle those whose opinions on language they do not share is 
also surprising. This coercion ofthe student runs contrary to the stated aim of these introductory 
writers, which is to look objectively at language, without the subjective bias typical of the lay 
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approach to language. A wiser approach to beginners, and one more consistent with the linguist's 
own doctrine of objectivity, would be to tell them that 
The linguist, of course, has the responsibility of observing and describing the 
language; and just as he does not pass judgment on language, so also he does not, 
qua linguist, pass judgment on those who pass judgment on language. (Halliday 
et al.1964: 172) 
Lawson complains that beginners' attention is drawn 'towards uncontentious issues and trivial 
discussions' and that the debate is framed 'as one between the current theory and "flaky" other 
options, rather than between competing viable world views' and he suggests that 
Since ... theories of language do not always disagree on trivial matters, but often 
on deep philosophical grounds, it would seem to be of utmost importance to an 
introduction to linguistics that the basic questions be topics of discussion which 
are not constrained or confined by what one particular theory views as proper. 
(2001:13-14) 
The chief problem with the way the texts I examined introduce the topic of prescriptivism is that 
they treat it as a problem to which linguists have found an easy solution. As Hutton observes, 'In 
the simplifications of contemporary textbooks, many of these debates appear as phoney wars 
between reason and blindness' (1998: 199). Yet the IS-OUGHT puzzle underlying the prescriptive/ 
descriptive debate is one of the basic epistemological questions. This is not to suggest that 
beginners should be embroiled in complex philosophical debates, but that proponents of current 
orthodox theory who take the responsibility for introducing students to linguistics should not 
close the door to the possibility of other ways of talking about language. 
The next chapter looks at the concept ofprescribing in more depth and from a discourse analysis 
perspective. 
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